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Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated 
Regionalism in Public Education
Erika K. Wilson
AbsTRAcT
School quality and resources vary dramatically across school district boundary lines. 
Students who live mere miles apart have access to disparate educational opportunities 
based on which side of a school district boundary line their home is located.  Owing in 
large part to metropolitan fragmentation, most school districts and the larger localities 
in which they are situated are segregated by race and class.  Further, because of a 
strong ideological preference for localism in public education, local government law 
structures in most states do not require or even encourage collaboration between school 
districts in order to address disparities between them.  As a result, the combination of 
metropolitan fragmentation and localism in public education leads to the exclusion 
of poor and minority students from access to high-quality school districts, which are 
largely clustered in more affluent and predominately white localities. 
This Article contends that, given the race- and class-based exclusionary effects that 
metropolitan fragmentation and localism have on public education, the time has come 
to reconsider the wholesale commitment to localism in public education.  It suggests 
that in some instances, the dissemination of public education should be made on a 
regional basis rather than a local basis.  It examines how enacting regionalism—a 
theoretical framework, which advocates for the installment of regional governance 
structures—might occur in public education.  Borrowing from two specific theories of 
regionalism, equitable regionalism and federated regionalism, it proposes a framework 
entitled “Equitable Federated Regionalism” for disseminating public education on a 
regional basis.  It suggests that enacting Equitable Federated Regionalism as a form of 
state law reform would help to ameliorate current disparities in public education that 
occur along the basis of race and class.
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INTRODUCTION 
“I am an ex-felon.  However, I did not burglarize or assault anyone.  I 
did not rape or steal.  I was convicted [of] falsifying records about my 
residency so that my daughters could attend a safer, higher-
performing suburban school.”1 
 
In the American public education system, local rather than state or even 
federal citizenship is critical.  Students receive disparate educational opportunities 
depending on which side of a school district boundary line they live on.2  Such 
disparities are legally permissible because courts view them as race-neutral geo-
graphical distinctions beyond their remedial purview.3  Indeed, courts consistent-
ly find that current patterns of segregation and inequality in school districts today 
are the result of private forces that shape residential location choices.4  Yet, in re-
ality, the geographic boundaries that define school districts are the product of lo-
cal government law structures that foster residential segregation and exclusion 
based on race and class.5  As a result, race, class, and geography intersect to shape 
  
1. Kelley Williams-Bolar, I am a ‘Criminal’ Because I Wanted a Good Education for My Girls, SKANNER 
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.theskanner.com/opinion/commentary/15478-Kelley-WilliamsBolar 
-I-am-a-Criminal-Because-I-Wanted-a-Good-Education-for-My-Daughters-2012-08-20. 
2. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 499–501 (2010) 
[hereinafter Saiger, Boundary Problem] (describing inequalities in public education along 
geographical lines, noting that school district boundaries allocate educational quality and 
opportunity according to residential location). 
3. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 94–96 (1995) (rejecting an interdistrict school 
desegregation plan by reasoning that demographic changes independent of de jure segregation 
impact the racial composition of student assignment plans); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangle, 
427 U.S. 424, 436 (1976) (finding that current patterns of segregation in schools is the result of 
“normal pattern[s] of human migration”). 
4. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
amount of present-day school segregation attributable to state sponsored discrimination is minimal 
and instead suggesting that private forces such as migration patterns and white flight from inner 
cities are primarily responsible for modern-day school segregation).  But cf. Nancy A. Denton, The 
Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. 
REV. 795, 812–13 (1996) (“By treating school and neighborhood segregation as separate, we 
ignore that the original bases for neighborhood segregation were state-sponsored and state-
approved . . . .”). 
5. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1861 (1994) (“[L]ocal boundaries, once established, are difficult to alter; 
segregated localities form autonomous political units whose internal political processes tend to 
replicate existing demographics . . . .”); Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce 
Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 878 (2006) [hereinafter 
Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies] (“Governmental fragmentation—the proliferation of 
separate political jurisdictions—facilitates structures such as exclusionary zoning laws.  By pro-
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the opportunities available to students and to exclude poor minority students 
from access to high-quality schools.6  The case of Kelley Williams-Bolar provides 
an illustrative example. 
In 2011, a court convicted Kelley Williams-Bolar, an African American 
mother of two, of two felony counts of tampering with records.7  A judge sen-
tenced her to five years in prison for each count.8  Her crimes consisted of falsi-
fying her address so that she could enroll her two children in the suburban 
Copley-Fairlawn, Ohio school district instead of the Akron, Ohio school dis-
trict that her daughters were required to attend based on her actual address.9  In 
pursuing criminal charges against Ms. Williams-Bolar, school officials rea-
soned that Ms. Williams-Bolar was stealing from citizens who pay taxes to live 
in the Copley-Fairlawn School District.10  Further, the judge who sentenced 
her indicated that she was given jail time as a deterrent to stop other nonresi-
dents from unlawfully enrolling in school districts in which they are not entitled 
to enroll.11 
  
hibiting the development of housing that only the better-off can afford, these local policies 
effectively exclude the poor and people of color from the places that erect those policy fences.”  
(footnote omitted)). 
6. See Daniel Kiel, The Enduring Power of Milliken’s Fences, 45 URB. LAW. 137, 144 (2013) 
(describing the role of local law in perpetuating racial disparities in public education noting that 
“just as the law had once mandated separation based upon race, so too does contemporary district 
sovereignty, enshrined in law, mandate separation based upon geography”). 
7. Julianne Hing, Kelley William-Bolar’s Long, Winding Fight to Educate Her Daughters, COLOR-
LINES (May 16, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/05/kelley_williams_ 
bolar_school_choice.html. 
8. STATE OF OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY, KELLY WILLIAMS-BOLAR CLEMENCY 
REPORT 3 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/Public/Williams 
BolarKellyClemency.pdf.  Ultimately Ms. Williams-Bolar served nine days in jail, was placed on 
probation for two years and, among other things, required to perform eighty hours of community 
service, abstain from consuming drugs or alcohol, and submit to random and frequent urine testing 
to detect for drugs or alcohol.  Id. 
9. See id.  The address Ms. Williams-Bolar used was her father’s address.  See id. at 8.  The court also 
charged her father with one count of grand theft and one count of tampering with records.  See id. 
at 12; Ed Meyer, Father of Kelley Williams-Bolar Gets New Court-Appointed Attorney in School 
Residency Case, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL ONLINE (last updated June 18, 2011, 11:11 AM), 
http://www.ohio.com/news/father-of-kelley-williams-bolar-gets-new-court-appointed-attorney-
in-school-residency-case-1.197885. 
10. Andrea Canning & Leezel Tanglao, Ohio Mom Kelley Williams-Bolar Jailed for Sending Kids to Better 
School District, ABC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/ohio-mom-jailed-sending-
kids-school-district/story?id=12763654.  In addition to the tampering with records charges, the 
court also charged Ms. Williams-Bolar with one count of felony grand theft.  The court ultimately 
dismissed the felony grand theft charge after the jury deadlocked and was unable to reach a verdict on 
the charge.  STATE OF OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTHORITY, supra note 8, at 12.   
11. See State of Ohio v. Kelley Bollar-Williams, Case No. CR 2009-10-3223A, Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 10: 10–
13 (“[S]ome punishment is appropriate so that others who think they might defraud the school 
system might think twice.”); Canning & Tanglao, supra note 10. 
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Significantly, Ms. Williams-Bolar’s address in Akron is only three miles 
from the address that she used to obtain access to the Copley-Fairlawn school 
district.12  But the Akron and Copley-Fairlawn School Districts are vastly differ-
ent.  The Akron school district is labeled in need of continuous improvement, 
because of its subpar performance on state assessments, and it has a predomi-
nately Black13 and poor student population.14  The Copley-Fairlawn school dis-
trict is labeled excellent with distinction, because of its superb performance on 
state assessments, and it has a predominately white and middle-class student 
population.15 
The criminal prosecution of Ms. Williams-Bolar, along with the glaring ac-
ademic and demographic differences between the neighboring Akron and Cop-
ley-Fairlawn school districts, serves as a cautionary tale regarding the exclusionary 
role that local government law structures play in public education.  Specifically, 
school district boundary lines foster exclusion and inequality in public education 
along the lines of race and class. 
  
12. See Karoli, How Ohio’s Copley-Fairlawn School District Keeps Their Lily-White Reputation, ODD 
TIMES SIGNATURES (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.drumsnwhistles.com/2011/01/26/ohio-copley-
fairlawn-discriminates. 
13. When using the term “Black”, I use the upper-case “B” to reflect the view, articulated by other 
scholars, that Black people are a specific cultural group and that the term “Black” is worthy of being 
capitalized as a proper noun.  See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n. 2 
(1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like 
Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require 
denotation as a proper noun.); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 
1710 n.3 (1993) (“I use the term ‘Black’ throughout the paper for the reasons articulated by 
Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw. I share her view that ‘Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 
‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun. 
(citing Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988))); Catherine Mackinnon, 
Feminism, Marxisim, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (suggesting that the letter “B” in Black should be capitalized because 
Black is not “merely a color of skin pigmentation, but . . . a heritage, an experience, a culture and 
personal identity . . .”).   
14. OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., AKRON PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 2011–2012 SCHOOL YEAR REPORT 
CARD 5 (2012), available at http://archive.education.ohio.gov/reportcardfiles/2011-2012/dist/ 
043489.pdf (noting that students in the district only met five out of twenty-six indicators of 
academic achievement on state assessments and that 86.7 percent of students are considered 
economically disadvantaged and 46.2 percent are African American). 
15. OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., COPLEY-FAIRLAWN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT: 2011–2012 SCHOOL 
YEAR REPORT CARD 5 (2012), available at http://reportcard.education.ohio.gov/Archives/ 
Copley-Fairlawn%20City%20-%20Summit/Copley-Fairlawn%20City%20-%20Summit/049 
981_2011-2012_DIST.pdf (noting that students in the district met all twenty-six indicators of 
academic achievement on state assessments and that only 18.7 percent of students are considered 
economically disadvantaged and 74.6 percent of students are white). 
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With few exceptions, school districts draw boundary lines so that students 
attend school where they live.16  School districts are independent and autono-
mous local governments.17  They are responsible only for providing education 
to the students who live within the district’s boundary lines.18  Metropolitan 
fragmentation—the existence of numerous local governments within a metro-
politan area19—produces high levels of race- and class-based residential segre-
gation.20  Because school districts draw boundary lines so that students attend 
school where they live, the demographics and resources available to school dis-
tricts are a function of the localities in which they are situated.21 
  
16. A few school districts have interdistrict open enrollment plans, which allow students to attend a 
school outside of the district in which they live.  Interdistrict plans, however, are limited insofar as 
they allow the receiving school districts to turn away students if they lack the capacity to 
accommodate them.  Other logistical challenges, such as transporting students between district 
lines and limitations on the number of interdistrict transfers a receiving district will take, limit the 
overall effectiveness of many of the interdistrict enrollment plans.  Aaron Y. Tang, Privileges and 
Immunities, Public Education, and the Case for Public School Choice, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1103, 
1115–18 (2011) (documenting the states that have interdistrict enrollment statutes and the practical 
impediments to effectively utilizing the interdistrict enrollment options). 
17. Though the provision of public education is one of the powers reserved to the states under the 
Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, most state legislatures delegate this power to school 
districts.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Sch. Dist. of Independence v. Jones, 653 S.W.2d 178, 185 (Mo. 
1983) (“School districts are bodies corporate, instrumentalities of the state established by statute to 
facilitate effectual discharge of the General Assembly’s constitutional mandate to ‘establish and 
maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state . . . .’”); 
Pocantico Home & Land Co. v. Union Free Sch. Dist. of Tarrytowns, 799 N.Y.S.2d 235, 239 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (“School districts in this State are creatures of statute, which can only be 
formed, dissolved, or altered in accordance with the provisions of Title II of the Education Law.”). 
18. See Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS 
AND THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION POLITICS 24, 25 (William G. Howell ed., 2005) [hereinafter 
Briffault, The Local School District] (“Territorially, the school district has authority over only the 
geographically defined portion of the state that falls with its boundaries”). 
19. The terms “metropolitan area” and “metropolitan region” are used interchangeably throughout this 
Article to mean “a core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent 
communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that core.”  Metropolitan 
and Micropolitan: About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/metro/about (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
20. See George C. Galster, Polarization, Race, and Place, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1422, 1432–33 (1993) (“A 
notable feature of most American metropolitan areas is their jurisdictional fragmentation . . . .  This 
fragmentation constrains minorities primarily by intensifying income-class spatial segregation and 
attendant fiscal disparities among jurisdictions.”); Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies, supra note 
5, at 877–79 (arguing that metropolitan fragmentation results in residential segregation and 
concentrated poverty).  For a fuller discussion of the reasons why metropolitan fragmentation leads 
to race- and class-based residential segregation, see infra Part I.A and accompanying footnotes. 
21. See Denton, supra note 4, at 815 (describing the role of metropolitan fragmentation in creating 
residential segregation and in turn school segregation); Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 
502–03 (describing how school districts take on the financial and racial characteristics of the larger 
locality in which they are situated). 
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Thus, school districts in more affluent, typically predominately white locali-
ties have more resources and can offer educational inputs that significantly en-
hance the quality of education students receive.22  Conversely, school districts in 
poorer, typically predominately minority localities have fewer resources and edu-
cational inputs to offer relative to the need of their students.23  Further, owing in 
large part to a preference for local control of public education, local government 
law structures in most states do not require or even encourage interdistrict collab-
oration in order to address disparities between neighboring school districts.24  In 
fact, as demonstrated by Ms. Williams-Bolar’s case, the law permits school dis-
tricts to exclude nonresidents through extreme means including criminally prose-
cuting those who impermissibly cross school district boundary lines.25 
  
22. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Urban Sprawl and the Constitution: Educational Inequality as an Impetus to 
Low Density Living, 42 URB. LAW. 95, 96–97 (2010) (noting that schools and school districts 
evidence a patchwork of inequality and that while “[s]ome schools . . . are distinguished by their 
brand new facilities, technological innovation, experienced and highly paid staff, and upper middle-
class white student body . . . others are noted for their decaying infrastructure, antiquated textbooks, 
inexperienced teachers and poor minority students”). 
23. Id. 
24. See Jennifer Jellison Holme, Sarah L. Diem & Katherine Cumings Mansfield, Regional Coalitions 
and Educational Policy: Lessons from the Nebraska Learning Community Agreement, in INTEGRATING 
SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: NEW POLICIES AND LEGAL OPTIONS FOR A 
MULTIRACIAL GENERATION 151 (Erica Frankenberg & Elizabeth Debray eds., University of 
North Carolina Press 2011) [hereinafter Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational 
Policy] (noting the lack of cooperation between school districts to address racial and economic 
isolation of students); Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 857, 867–68 (2006) [hereinafter Saiger, The Last Wave] (noting that for suburbanites 
“educational localism provides a method for [the] realiz[ation] . . . of segregation by wealth and taste 
for education; the concomitant ability to wall themselves off from responsibility, both fiscal and 
political, for less fortunate school systems; and a way to capitalize their tax investments in public 
school into privately held home values” (footnotes omitted)). 
25. See, e.g., Mike Colombo, Father Could Face Charges for Lying About Address to Enroll Son in Oldham 
Co. Schools, WHAS11.COM (Aug. 28, 2011, 12:14 AM), http://www.whas11.com/home/ 
128543123.html; John Nickerson, Mom Accused of Stealing Education Pleads Guilty, STAMFORD 
ADVOCATE (Feb. 22, 2012, 10:14 PM), http://www.stamfordadvocate.com/news/article/Mom-
accused-of-stealing-education-pleads-guilty-3349999.php (reporting that a mother in Bridgeport, 
Connecticut was charged with first degree larceny by defrauding a public community for sending 
her son to school in Norwalk, Connecticut, instead of Bridgeport, Connecticut where she lived); 
Eddy Ramírez, Schools Crack Down on Boundary Hopping, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 
2, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2009/03/02/schools-crack-down-on-bound 
ary-hopping (reporting that a woman in Rochester, New York was arrested and charged with two 
felonies, third degree larceny, and first degree offering of a false instrument for filing for allegedly 
lying about her children’s residency to send them to another school district); Aubrey Whelan, Deal 
Offered to Philadelphia Parents Who Sent Daughter to Lower Moreland School, PHILLY.COM (Nov. 
10, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-11-10/news/35017489_1_olesia-garcia-ard-program-
services-and-conspiracy (reporting that Latino parents were charged with theft of services for 
sending their daughter to a school in a district where they allegedly did not live). 
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In many ways, the modern story of inequality and exclusion in education 
described above is part of a broader story often told by local government law 
scholars about how metropolitan fragmentation, in conjunction with localism,26 
creates inequalities between neighboring localities.27  These scholars trumpet 
regionalism—loosely defined as a theoretical framework that advocates for the 
enactment of regional government or governance structures—as a potential so-
lution to curbing the regional inequalities caused by metropolitan fragmenta-
tion and localism.28  Under the umbrella of regionalism, local government law 
scholars advance a number of different proposals.29  Although the particulars of 
the regionalism proposals vary, almost all of the proposals recognize the im-
portance of local governments working together to address issues on a regional 
level so that public goods can be disseminated more efficiently and equitably 
throughout metropolitan regions.30 
While both education law and local government law scholars recognize 
that fiscal and racial inequalities between neighboring school districts are a by-
product of metropolitan fragmentation and localism,31 few critically examine 
how regionalism might apply in the public education context.32  In part, the re-
  
26. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the 
Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 (2000) [hereinafter Cashin, Localism, Self-
Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter] (defining localism as an ideological preference for 
decentralized local governance).  Throughout this Article, I adopt the same definition of localism. 
27. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1115 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem] (discussing 
the ways in which local laws and structures breed economic and racial disparities between cities and 
suburbs); Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 
1991–95 (noting that the segregation of the poor, affluent, white, and nonwhite has increased 
along with the creation of numerous autonomous local governments). 
28. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism Part II]; Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the 
Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26; Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, 
Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH L. REV. 93 (2003) [hereinafter Reynolds, 
Intergovernmental Cooperation]. 
29. See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 28, at 112–16 (describing the similarities 
and variations in regionalism proposals). 
30. See Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW. 483, 493–94 
(2007) [hereinafter Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance] (noting that equity and 
efficiency are two important ideological defenses of regionalism proposals). 
31. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism Part II, supra note 28, at 438 (arguing that metropolitan 
fragmentation leads to economic disparities between neighboring jurisdictions and that children in 
poorer jurisdictions receive inferior educational opportunities); Kiel, supra note 6, at 146–47 
(describing the effects of education localism in creating educational disparities along the lines of 
race and class in a highly fragmented metropolitan areas). 
32. See, e.g., Elizabeth Debray & Erica Frankenberg, Federal Legislation to Promote Metropolitan 
Approaches to Educational and Housing Opportunity, in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A 
CHANGING SOCIETY: NEW POLICIES FOR A MULTIRACIAL GENERATION 281–301 (Erica 
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luctance of these scholars to take on this task lies in a deep-seated belief that lo-
calism in public education is so entrenched that regionalism in education is po-
litically and practically infeasible.33  This Article challenges that notion.  It 
critically examines the ways in which regionalism might be applied in public 
education.   
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief overview of the 
causes of metropolitan fragmentation and the inequalities that it produces 
within metropolitan areas.  Part I then situates metropolitan fragmentation 
within the literature on localism, examining the benefits and costs of localism.  
Part II analyzes how adherence to localism in the public education context, in 
conjunction with metropolitan fragmentation, creates disparities between 
neighboring school districts along the lines of race and class.  It then makes the 
normative claim that the sole reliance on localist educational governance struc-
tures is harmful because it disguises the extent to which localities within metro-
politan areas are interdependent.34 
Part III sets forth the various theories of regionalism and analyzes the 
ways in which regionalism could be used to eliminate regional disparities be-
tween school districts.  Part IV specifically considers two forms of regionalism 
that policymakers could apply to the public education context: equitable re-
gionalism and federated regionalism.  Borrowing from principles of equitable 
regionalism and federated regionalism, it proposes an analytical framework 
entitled “Equitable Federated Regionalism” that could be used as a guide in 
enacting regionalism in public education.  
  
Frankenberg & Elizabeth Debray eds., 2011) (recognizing that metropolitan solutions are 
essential to decreasing school segregation and proposing a regional combination of housing 
subsidies and interdistrict school transfers as a means of addressing school segregation); Myron 
Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and the Hope for Regional Reform, 55 
BUFF. L. REV. 91 (2007) [hereinafter Orfield, The Region and Taxation] (discussing the role that 
state equalization of funding has had on lessening the effects of localism in school funding, 
recognizing the role of fragmentation in creating educational inequalities, and suggesting that 
state equalization of funding offers hope for new regionalism theories of governance). 
33. See Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational Policy, supra note 24, at 152–53 
(noting that regional policies in education remain few in number because they are difficult to 
create). 
34. See Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 510–12 (2005) 
(noting that Americans live on a regional scale in terms of travel, shopping, and recreational needs 
and as a result, the economies and social wellbeing of localities within metropolitan regions are 
codependent on one another). 
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I. METROPOLITAN FRAGMENTATION: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
Metropolitan fragmentation35 and political decentralization36 are prominent 
characteristics of U.S. local government law structures.  Scores of independent and 
autonomous local governments operate throughout most U.S. metropolitan re-
gions.37  The highly fragmented and politically decentralized American metropo-
lis is the result of conscious design rather than coincidence.38  Some scholars 
suggest that metropolitan fragmentation is beneficial because it results in the effi-
cient provision of public goods by breeding competition among multiple localities 
for residents.39  Furthermore, scholars also contend that political decentralization 
facilitates democracy and democratic values because smaller local governments are 
closer to citizens and more readily allow citizens to participate in the democracy.40 
Yet metropolitan fragmentation and political decentralization come at a cost, 
namely economic and racial segregation between localities.41  This Part provides a 
brief overview of the causes of metropolitan fragmentation and describes why 
  
35. This Article uses the term “metropolitan fragmentation” to mean the existence of several 
overlapping and independent local governments across metropolitan regions.  See generally 
GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION 
AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 4 (A. Gary Dworkin ed., 1991) (defining and discussing 
the causes of metropolitan fragmentation). 
36. This Article uses the term political decentralization to mean the delegation of political power to a 
subordinate unit of government.  See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: 
Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (noting that decentralization has 
many meanings and discussing the meaning of decentralization within the political context). 
37. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: ORGANIZATION COMPONENT 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES, TABLE 2. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY TYPE AND STATE (2012), 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2012/formatted_prelim_counts_23jul2012_2.xls (showing that as 
of 2012, there were a total of 89,004 local governments operating throughout the United States and a 
total of 12,884 independent school districts); Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 28, 
at 93 (arguing that “[m]etropolitan America remains stubbornly resistant to attempts to limit local 
government proliferation and the political fragmentation and territorial overlapping it produces”). 
38. WEIHER, supra note 35, at 3–4 (noting that in other countries, even where there is suburbanization 
or fragmentation, it serves a rational public purpose of equalizing economic development). 
39. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
40. WEIHER, supra note 35, at 2–3 (characterizing decentralization and fragmentation in American 
metropolitan regions as Jeffersonian in its origins because of the emphasis on local governments 
with the understanding that they are supposed to be the incubators of democracy, training citizens 
in their rights and responsibilities). 
41. See, e.g., Kendra Bischoff, School District Fragmentation and Racial Residential Segregation: 
How Do Boundaries Matter?, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 182, 197–200 (2008) (finding support for 
the hypothesis that fragmentation increases residential racial segregation through the Theil 
Index).  The Theil Index measures the evenness or unevenness of the spatial distribution of 
population subgroups in tracts within counties.  It is used to measures levels of racial diversity 
or economic inequality in a particular area.  See Thiel, Henri and Anthony J. Finezza, A Note 
on the measurement of racial integration of schools by means of informational concept, 1 J. 
MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 187, 187–94 (1971).  
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metropolitan fragmentation results in racial and economic residential segregation.  
It also discusses how the preference for localism or decentralized governance struc-
tures, in conjunction with metropolitan fragmentation, creates inequalities be-
tween neighboring localities within metropolitan areas. 
A. Race, Class, and Metropolitan Fragmentation 
Metropolitan fragmentation is purportedly race and class neutral.  No laws 
mandate that localities must consist of persons of a particular race or class.  Nev-
ertheless, a substantial body of research demonstrates that the more fragmented a 
metropolitan area is, the more likely racial and economic segregation exists within 
that metropolitan area.42  Numerous factors lead to metropolitan fragmentation 
occurring along the lines of race and class.43  Two factors worth highlighting are 
(1) the role of federal, state, and local laws and policies in creating racial and eco-
nomic residential segregation across political boundary lines, and (2) theories re-
lated to residential sorting.  This Subpart discusses these factors in turn. 
1. The Role of State, Federal, and Local Laws and Policies in Perpetuating 
Residential Segregation 
State laws that make incorporation and the formation of local governments 
relatively easy contribute significantly to metropolitan fragmentation.44  States 
have exclusive control over the creation of local governments.  In Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh, the U.S. Supreme Court held that local governments are merely polit-
ical subdivisions of the state and that states have plenary power over local gov-
ernments in every regard.45  Thus, states determine whether to create local 
governments, the amount of power they can exercise, and their relationship 
to other local governments within a metropolitan region.46 
  
42. See Bischoff, supra note 41, at 197–200; WEIHER, supra note 35, at 31–32 ; Scott J. South, Kyle 
Crowder; Jeremy Pais, Metropolitan Structure and Neighborhood Attainment: Exploring 
Intermetropolitan Variation in Racial Residential Segregation, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 1263, 1289 (2011) 
(finding that political fragmentation shapes neighborhood composition for whites by providing 
whites with more opportunities to locate in exclusively white neighborhoods). 
43. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (providing a thorough 
historical account of how neighborhoods came to be racially and economically segregated). 
44. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Standards for Municipal Incorporations on the Urban Fringe, 36 TEX. 
L. REV. 271 (1958) (describing various state requirements for incorporation and noting the 
leniency of many state incorporation standards). 
45. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907). 
46. See id. (holding that municipal corporations are subdivisions of the state and that the state “at its 
pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers [of the corporation], . . . hold it itself, or vest it in 
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During the nineteenth century, state legislatures often exercised their plena-
ry powers to require the annexation of unincorporated territories to a neighboring 
larger central city.47  The preference for annexation during this time reflected an 
underlying normative belief that larger centralized governance structures were 
more efficient than smaller decentralized governance structures.48  During the 
twentieth century, however, suburban services improved while the racial and eth-
nic demographics of central cities changed, particularly with an influx of Europe-
an immigrants and African American migrants from the South.  These changes 
caused many suburban residents to resist annexation.49  As a result, state laws in 
relation to unincorporated suburbs began to shift their focus away from annexa-
tion and toward incorporation.50  Indeed, many states significantly relaxed their 
incorporation requirements.51 
  
other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another 
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation”).  It is worth noting that many 
scholars have questioned whether the Court’s description in Hunter of states having plenary power 
and absolute control over local governments is still valid, since states are increasingly and voluntarily 
relinquishing certain powers to local governments, thereby allowing the local governments to 
exercise significant independence.  See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, A Role for Local Government Law in 
Federal-State-Local Disputes, 43 URB. LAW. 977, 992 (2011).  Nevertheless, the principle of 
absolute state power over local governments articulated in Hunter continues to define the legal 
relationship between state and local governments. 
47. See, e.g., PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 55 (1995) (noting that state laws during the 
twentieth century ensured that almost no alternative to annexation by the central city existed for a 
suburb that wanted to enjoy better public services because state laws did not permit existing 
township and county governments to provide many public services); see also Daly v. Morgan, 16 A. 
287, 289 (1888) (rejecting an attempt to stop Baltimore from annexing an unincorporated territory 
reasoning that “[n]o one knew better than the framers of the [Maryland] constitution . . . that the 
time [would] come . . . when the extension of the limits of a great city like Baltimore would be 
absolutely necessary to its proper growth and development”). 
48. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 144 (1985) (noting that the desire of state legislators to draft laws encouraging 
annexation was the belief that a larger organization was more efficient than a smaller one and that 
economies of scale would accrue from a larger city government). 
49. See id. at 150 (stating that annexation fell out of favor with suburban residents and state legislatures 
because of improved suburban services and sharper racial, ethnic, and class distinctions in central 
cities). 
50. See id. at 148–50 (chronicling the decline in population in major central cities in the United States 
during the twentieth century and suggesting that the reason for the decline was a shift from state 
laws favoring annexation and consolidation polices to the enactment of state laws that allowed for 
suburbs outside of central cities to incorporate with relative ease); KANTOR, supra note 47, at 164 
(“Because state law in the twentieth century was altered to allow relatively easy incorporation in 
order to prevent further annexation by central cities of suburban areas, families and businesses 
moving to suburbia almost universally sought municipal incorporation in order to control the 
development of their communities.”). 
51. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 5, at 1863 (asserting that many states allowed for incorporation if the 
residents of unincorporated territories could show that a minimum number of their neighbors 
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While relatively lax state laws related to local government incorporation 
contributed to the current state of metropolitan fragmentation, federal laws and 
policies contributed to metropolitan fragmentation along racial lines.52  Other 
scholars have written extensively about the role of the federal government in con-
tributing to the racialized nature of metropolitan fragmentation and a complete 
account is beyond the scope of this Article.53  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that the federal government subsidized mortgages54 and provided states with fed-
eral funds to build highways55 that made it easier for white middle-class citizens 
to live in suburban outposts and to commute to central cities for work.56  At the 
same time, the federal government created policies that made it relatively easy for 
whites to move to suburban outposts, while also ensuring that poor and minority 
residents would remain confined to central cities.57  Notably, the Federal Hous-
ing Administration mortgage insurance underwriting program underwrote loans 
for home purchases only in white racially homogenous communities and explicit-
ly encouraged the maintenance of residential segregation as a matter of public 
  
favored incorporation); Mandelker, supra note 44, at 276–77 (asserting that state statutes allowed 
for incorporation via a showing of vague and minimal requirements, for instance that incorporation 
must be “right and proper” or “reasonable”). 
52. In addition, state and local laws and polices also contributed to metropolitan fragmentation being 
racially circumscribed.  See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?: Exploring the 
Significance of Race and Class Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 163, 173–74 (2009) (describing racial zoning ordinances enacted by various municipalities 
that explicitly dictated that areas be zoned for a particular race). 
53. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 43, at 149–53; DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT 
SUBURBS 24–25 (3d ed. 2003); Thomas W. Hanchett, The Other “Subsidized Housing”: Federal Aid 
to Suburbanization, 1940s–1960s, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES: IN SEARCH 
OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 163, 171–73 (John F. 
Bauman et al. eds., 2000). 
54. More specifically, the New Deal legislation created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) after the great depression in 1933.  The HOLC offered low-interest long-term loans to 
help families purchase homes.  The HOLC, however, developed residential maps to categorize the 
risks associated with lending money to residents interested in purchasing houses in a particular 
neighborhood.  The HOLC maps categorized any neighborhood with Black residents as extremely 
high risk.  As a result, both the HOLC and the private lending market denied loans to Blacks, as 
the private lending market also used the HOLC maps when categorizing the risks associated with 
issuing a mortgage.  See RUSK, supra note 53, at 24–25. 
55. See e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW 
URBAN POOR 46 (1996) (noting that the suburbanization of the middle class was facilitated by the 
federal government’s transportation and highway policy); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons 
of American Apartheid: The Necessity and Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 479, 491 (1995) (“[T]he federal government’s role in using the interstate highway 
and urban renewal programs to segregate blacks has been documented often.”). 
56. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 43, at 149. 
57. See id. 
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policy.58  While the federal government ended these policies during the 1950s, it 
failed to enact laws and policies to prohibit housing discrimination until nearly a 
decade later,59 by which time it had already greatly assisted in the entrenchment 
of racially identifiable spaces in the cities and suburbs.60  Further, gaps in the en-
forcement of federal antidiscrimination housing laws61 and resistance to affirma-
tive suburban desegregation programs allowed white racial homogeneity outside 
of central cities to persist unabated well after the enactment of federal antidis-
crimination housing laws.62 
In addition to federal laws and polices contributing to racially circumscribed 
metropolitan fragmentation, local governments enacted land use and taxation 
policies that also ensured that only middle-class or affluent residents would be 
able to move to certain, usually suburban, localities.63  Indeed, during the era of 
mass suburbanization, many suburban localities enacted zoning laws that pre-
cluded the poor, who were also likely to be minorities, from residing in the sub-
  
58. See RUSK, supra note 53, at 24–25 (noting that the Federal Housing Administration and the 
Veterans Administration, which provided housing loan assistance to military veterans, embraced 
HOLC’s racially discriminatory underwriting practices).  The Federal Housing Administration 
encouraged the use of racially restrictive covenants as late as 1950, after the U.S. Supreme Court 
had found such covenants unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1 (1948).  See generally 
GUY STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK: THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (2003) (describing the history of discrimination by the Federal Housing 
Administration in its loan underwriting program). 
59. The Fair Housing Act, signed into law in 1968, is aimed at prohibiting discrimination in the sale, 
rental, or financing of housing on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3604(a)–3604(e) (2000).  Significantly, the Fair Housing Act was one of the last pieces of 
federal civil rights legislation enacted.  The Act was passed largely as a response to rioting by 
frustrated members of the Black community who were limited to living in segregated urban ghettos 
as a result of discrimination in the housing market.  See 114 CONG. REC. 2278 (statement of Sen. 
Walter Mondale) (“[T]here is a substantial market of financially able Negroes prevented from 
buying housing of their choice because of deeply entrenched patterns of discrimination in the sale 
and rental of housing in our country.”). 
60. See Ford, supra note 5, at 1848–49 (arguing that federal government policies created racially 
identified spaces, which were further shaped by private associations of white homeowners who 
“lobbied city councils for zoning restrictions” and “threatened boycotts of real estate agents who sold 
homes to Blacks”). 
61. Before the 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act, the Act was widely viewed as ineffective 
because of barriers to enforcement of the Act.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 15 (1988) 
(noting that although the Fair Housing Act “provides a clear national policy against discrimination 
in housing, it provides only limited means for enforcing the law”). 
62. See Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield, Why Racial Change in the Suburbs Matters, in THE 
RESEGREGATION OF SUBURBAN SCHOOLS: A HIDDEN CRISIS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 
1, 7 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2012) (describing efforts by Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Secretary George Romney to implement a suburban housing desegregation 
program to reduce racial segregation in the cities and suburbs that was blocked by then President 
Richard Nixon). 
63. State governments typically delegate nearly complete authority to control land use to local 
governments.  See KANTOR, supra note 47, at 126–27. 
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urbs through the adoption of minimum lot size requirements or single-family 
home restrictions.64  Such restrictions had the effect of driving up the cost of 
housing so that poor people could not afford to live in jurisdictions that have 
those types of zoning laws.65  Such zoning laws are still in effect today in many 
suburban jurisdictions and continue to have the same race- and class-based exclu-
sionary effects.66 
2. Residential Sorting Theories Explain Present Day Metropolitan 
Fragmentation Along the Lines of Race and Class 
While explicit federal, state, and local laws and policies undoubtedly con-
tributed to metropolitan fragmentation being circumscribed by race and class, 
residential sorting theories can also explain some of the persistence of race and 
class delineated metropolitan fragmentation.  Two residential sorting theories 
that have consequences for race and class stratification between school districts 
are worth noting: Charles Tiebout’s theory of local expenditures67 and Gregory 
Weiher’s theory that political boundaries serve a recruitment function.68 
Tiebout hypothesizes that the creation of multiple local governments 
with the autonomy to determine the level of public services and the level of 
taxation imposed on residents causes interjurisdictional competition within a 
metropolitan area for residents.69  This competition consists of jurisdictions 
offering varying levels of a public good or service and varying levels of taxa-
tion in order to provide for that public good or service.70  The differentiation 
in the levels of public goods, services, and taxation provided by various locali-
ties allows residents, who Tiebout considers to be consumer-voters, to “vote 
with their feet” by moving to the jurisdiction that offers the mix of goods, 
services, and taxation levels that suits the consumer-voter’s preference.71 
  
64. See, e.g., id. at 165; WEIHER, supra note 35, at 13. 
65. See WEIHER, supra note 35, at 13 (arguing that when zoning ordinances prohibit all housing 
except single-family dwellings, it increases the price of housing and effectively precludes the types 
of people that suburban dwellers deem undesirable from purchasing homes that comply with the 
zoning requirements). 
66. See RUSK, supra note 53, at 24–25, 90; see also infra Part I.B. 
67. See Tiebout, supra note 39. 
68. See WEIHER, supra note 35, at 166. 
69. See Tiebout, supra note 39. 
70. See id. at 418–20. 
71. See id.  
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While critics have questioned Tiebout’s theory on a number of grounds,72 it 
does have implications for understanding why metropolitan areas continue to be 
fragmented along the lines of race and class, particularly in the absence of explicit 
laws and policies that mandate or facilitate such racialized sorting.  To the extent 
that residents are indeed consumer-voters who select the municipality in which 
they want to live based on their preferences for a particular mix of public services 
and the local taxation rate, it is often the case that the municipalities that offer 
higher qualities of essential public goods (for example, public education) general-
ly charge more to live there.73  Consequently, such municipalities often contain a 
larger number of affluent (and usually white) residents because poor (and typical-
ly minority) residents often cannot afford to relocate to such municipalities.74 
Gregory Weiher’s boundary line recruitment theory also explains present-
day race and class circumscribed metropolitan fragmentation.  According to 
Weiher, boundary lines are interactive and serve numerous functions, including a 
political, economic, and social function.75  The interaction between the political, 
economic, and social functions gives social meaning to the area encompassed by 
the boundary lines and provides critical information that helps people to realize 
whatever preferences they may have.76 
  
72. Critics most vocally attack Tiebout’s theory for its failure to take into account the costs to 
consumer-voters of “voting with their feet.”  See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism Part II, supra note 28, 
at 420–22 (emphasizing the high monetary and nonmonetary costs of citizens “voting with their 
feet,” including the fact that poorer citizens have fewer options because of monetary and 
nonmonetary constraints such as the lack of affordable housing in some political jurisdictions and 
the need to be located in close proximity to a job, family, and friends that provide a social safety 
net).  For other criticisms, see id. at 429–30 (arguing that the fragmentation contemplated by 
Tiebout’s theory allows local governments to take actions without taking into account the 
externalities imposed on neighboring jurisdictions); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 23, 28–31 (1998) (arguing that Tiebout’s theory ignores other important local government 
functions and trivializes humanity through its economic model of public good consumption). 
73. See Briffault, Our Localism Part II, supra note 28, at 422–23. 
74. See id. at 420 (“[S]uburban exclusionary ordinances, such as large-lot zoning and the exclusion of 
multifamily and subsidized housing, drive up the cost of housing in many jurisdictions, denying 
many potential movers a meaningful choice of places to live.”); Note, The Equal Protecton Clause 
and Exclusionary Zoning After Vaitierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 63 (1971) (“The impact 
of exclusionary zoning falls most heavily on racial minorities, since proportionately more blacks 
than whites are members of low- and moderate-income families.”). 
75. According to Weiher, boundary lines serve a political function in that they ascribe political 
authority to officials to tax, spend, and regulate the land between the boundary lines.  They serve 
an economic function insofar as businesses located within the discrete areas circumscribed by 
boundary lines and the presence (or absence) of businesses within the boundary lines dictate the 
economic vitality of the area delineated by the boundary lines.  Finally, boundary lines perform a 
social function insofar as they structure the interactions of the people who live within them and 
give a social distinctiveness to the geography between the boundary lines.  WEIHER, supra note 
35, at 33–35. 
76. Id. at 35. 
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For example, ostensibly race-neutral local land use and taxation policies (a 
political function served by boundary lines) can often disproportionally exclude 
people of color from a locality.77  The locality can become known for its homo-
geneity, thereby allowing those who do prefer racial segregation to move into a 
racially segregated locality.78  Further, even when minorities have the means to 
move into more affluent, predominately white localities, they may also prefer to 
remain in racially segregated neighborhoods and the existence of discrete 
boundary lines gives them the information that they need to do so.79  Thus, to 
the extent that boundary lines provide social meaning to geographic spaces, they 
become recruitment tools that allow residents to locate themselves in accordance 
with their preferences thereby allowing metropolitan fragmentation to continue 
occurring along the lines of race and class in the absence of explicit federal, state, 
or local policies.80 
B. The Connection Between Fragmentation, Localism, and Distributional 
Inequalities Within Metropolitan Areas 
The race- and class-based residential segregation that often accompanies 
metropolitan fragmentation is also a result of a strong adherence to principles of 
localism.  Localism is the ideological preference for decentralized, independent, 
and autonomous governance structures.81  Localism is the theoretical foundation 
that underlies the current system of local government structuring in most metro-
politan areas today.82  One of the central tenants of localism is that local govern-
ment should “enable[] the people who live within . . . discrete areas to organize 
  
77. For a discussion of the ways in which race neutral land use and taxation policies can exclude 
minority residents from a locality, see infra Part I.B. 
78. See WEIHER, supra note 35, at 81–82 (arguing that “policy decisions in the past which have 
resulted in the creation of racially polar municipalities will be perpetuated by the tendency of the 
boundaries to structure the information that is available to persons making locational decisions”). 
79. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A Post-
Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729 (2001) [hereinafter 
Cashin, Middle Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration] (chronicling the development of 
middle-class Black suburbs and noting that many are created as a result of the apathy, and in some 
instances hostility, of middle-class Blacks towards living in predominately white suburbs). 
80. See Bischoff, supra note 41, at 186; Cashin, Middle Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration, 
supra note 79, at 735 (noting that “racial and economic fragmentation of metropolitan regions that 
results from this process of locational sorting reinforces and exacerbates social differences”); see 
WEIHER, supra note 35, at 82 (noting that past discriminatory policies that led to racially 
delineated boundary lines will continue to perpetuate racial segregation unless explicit action is 
taken to correct the effects of past discriminatory policies). 
81. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and The Tyranny of The Favored Quarter, supra note 26; 
Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 51 (2012). 
82. See Briffault, Our Localism Part II, supra note 28. 
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themselves into distinct political units and give[] those units power to make deci-
sions with respect to a range of public policies and services.”83 
The scholarly literature on localism offers three separate and distinct argu-
ments in support of enacting localist governance structures: efficiency,84 increased 
citizen participation,85 and inculcation of a strong sense of community among cit-
izens.86  Each of the justifications advanced in favor of localism has some merit.  
Smaller and more numerous local governments do in some sense promote effi-
ciency.  The ever-present threat of citizens leaving one locality within a metropol-
itan region for another results in competition among localities, which “creates an 
efficient local government marketplace.”87  Further, localism can in some instanc-
es lead to increased citizen participation.88  The creation of neighborhood coun-
cils within localities, for example, has proved successful in increasing civic 
engagement and community involvement in decision making.89  Finally, there is 
also support for the argument that localism helps to build a sense of community 
among residents.  Smaller and more homogenous communities have shown an 
ability to galvanize around issues that impact their community and to agree on 
collective courses of action.90 
Yet for all of the benefits wrought by localism, it has a number of sizable 
shortcomings.  The most comprehensive criticism of localism is that it generates 
spillovers, fiscal disparities, interlocal conflicts, and it excludes undesirable resi-
  
83. Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 27, at 1115. 
84. See generally Tiebout, supra note 39, at 418. 
85. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1069–70 (1980) 
[hereinafter Frug, The City as a Legal Concept] (arguing that small government is the best way to 
obtain civil engagement and to get citizens to participate in the democratic process). 
86. See Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 27, at 1115; Frug, The City as a 
Legal Concept, supra note 85, at 1072–73 (arguing that community building and smaller local 
governments are intertwined). 
87. Parlow, supra note 81, at 55–56 (arguing that local governments actually do compete for citizens 
and business or risk the consequences of an eroding tax base, resulting in local governments being 
more innovative than state or federal governments). 
88. See e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. 
PA. L. REV. 607, 649 (1997) (noting that social planners organized the city around the 
neighborhood because the neighborhood fosters community at the local level by increasing 
democratic participation). 
89. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 10 (1993) (stating 
that neighborhood governments offer the “possibility of face-to-face interaction, which lies at the 
heart of the theory of participatory democracy”); Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public 
Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
137, 166–87 (2008) (describing effective neighborhood councils and how they were able to increase 
citizen participation and engagement in communities in New York, California, Oregon, and 
Georgia). 
90. See Parlow, supra note 81, at 56 (“[H]omogeneity allows local governments to experiment and push 
policy agendas that might be less politically palatable or feasible at higher levels of government.”). 
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dents.91  In a highly fragmented metropolis, localism leads to spillovers because lo-
cal governments are each treated as their own “little republic.”92  They have locally 
bounded regulatory powers that do not empower or encourage collaboration with 
other localities.93  Thus, localities are free to make decisions related to land use, 
pollution, and taxation that inevitably impact the localities that surround them but 
without consulting with the other localities that may be impacted and without ful-
ly absorbing the costs of their actions.94 
In addition, localism leads to interlocal competition that strengthens some 
localities while weakening others.95  Following Tiebout’s theory of local expendi-
tures, many jurisdictions within metropolitan regions see themselves as competi-
tors for residents and businesses.96  In the fierce competition for residents and 
businesses, localities have an incentive to enact zoning policies that restrict land 
development to expensive homes and certain commercial properties because the 
inhabitants of such properties provide more revenue and require minimal social 
services.97  Such land use policies allow jurisdictions to define themselves in a way 
that makes them most attractive in the competition for so-called desirable busi-
nesses and residents.98  Unfortunately, it also results in gross interlocal fiscal dis-
parities.  This is the case because jurisdictions that use exclusionary zoning policies 
to limit land development to expensive homes and certain commercial properties 
are able to obtain more tax revenue while simultaneously excluding those who 
  
91. See Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 27, at 1115; Cashin, Localism, 
Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 1991–95. 
92. Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 27, at 1124. 
93. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 1997. 
94. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) (“The imaginary line 
defining a city’s corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions.  A city’s decisions 
inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders.  The granting of building 
permits for high rise apartments, industrial plants, and the like on the city’s fringe unavoidably 
contributes to problems of traffic congestion, school districting, and law enforcement immediately 
outside the city.  A rate change in the city’s sales or ad valorem tax could well have a significant 
impact on retailers and property values in areas bordering the city. . . . Yet no one would suggest 
that nonresidents likely to be affected by this sort of municipal action have a constitutional right to 
participate in the political processes bringing it about.”). 
95. Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 27, at 1136. 
96. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J.L. & POL. 365 (2005). 
97. Notably, this type of fiscal zoning was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. 
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), in which the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that severely 
restricted multifamily housing and industrial and commercial use of land, reasoning that the 
restrictions were appropriate in order to maintain the preferred residential character of the area.  
Village of Euclid provided a blueprint for exclusionary zoning techniques currently used by localities 
to build their tax base while minimizing costs expended on social services. 
98. See Orfield, The Region and Taxation, supra note 32, at 92 (arguing that localities compete with 
each other for tax wealth and social status in the form of businesses and high-income white 
residents). 
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would require more social services such as the poor and minorities.99  This forces 
poor and minority residents to choose localities with weaker tax bases and an ina-
bility to meet the much-needed demand for social services.100 
Finally, localism, through its reliance on boundaries to allow for discrete self-
governance,101 facilitates a perverse type of community building that breeds racial 
and economic exclusion.102  Localities are free to build racially and economically 
homogenous communities that exclude poor people and people of color.  This is 
because under the guise of localism, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of 
local government land use decisions that allow localities to construct so-called de-
sirable communities103 and to enact local land use devices that have the effect of 
disproportionately excluding poor and minority people from a locality.104 
  
99. See, e.g., MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND 
STABILITY 62 (1997) (noting that jurisdictions compete for property wealth and that fiscal zoning 
allows jurisdictions to deliberately develop zoning policies that only allow for expensive homes and 
commercial property which enables them to “limit social need and the demand on [the] tax base 
that it can engender”). 
100. Importantly, as local government law scholars have noted, the competition between jurisdictions 
for desirable businesses and residents is often not on even terms.  Affluent jurisdictions are able to 
obtain a larger and disproportionate share of public infrastructure investments such as highways 
and roads that contributes to their ability to attract businesses and residents.  They are also able to 
“garner[] many of the benefits of participating in a regional economy—such as access to regional 
labor markets and consumers, as well as to regional highway systems . . . while not sharing 
appreciably in regional social burdens.”  Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the 
Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 2014–15.  This results in localities not internalizing the true costs 
of their decisions.  See id. at 2006. 
101. See supra Part I.B. 
102. Some scholars have gone even further, arguing that localism does not just facilitate racial 
segregation and concentrated poverty but instead is a direct causal agent of racial segregation 
and concentrated poverty.  See, e.g., David D. Troutt, Localism and Segregation, 16 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 323, 325 (2007) (“It is time that localism, 
legal and cultural, be recognized as the primary agent behind resegregation . . . .”); John Powell, 
Race, Place, and Opportunity, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 21, 2008), http://prospect.org/article/race-
place-and-opportunity. 
103. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71–72 (1976) (upholding a zoning 
ordinance that limited the places in which theaters showing sexually explicit movies could be 
located and in doing so reasoned that “the city’s interest in the present and future character of its 
neighborhoods adequately supports” the restrictive zoning ordinances); Vill. of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited three or more 
unrelated people from living together, reasoning that to the extent the ordinance sought to create a 
“quiet place where yards are wide open, people few, and motor vehicles restricted,” such a purpose 
was a permissible objective and the ordinance was a rational means of achieving that objective). 
104. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1977) 
(rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that it was denied a zoning variance that would have allowed it to 
build a low-income housing development outside of Chicago because of racial animus after 
acknowledging that Black people were disproportionately affected by the lack of affordable housing 
caused by the zoning ordinance at issue).  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim despite evidence 
that opponents of the zoning ordinance made reference to “what was referred to as the ‘social issue’ 
the desirability or undesirability of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights low- and 
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Disturbingly, because of the aforementioned costs of localism, the economic 
and political advantages enjoyed by predominantly white and affluent jurisdictions 
are now institutionalized such that most people accept them as normal without 
questioning the inequities they represent.105  Many do not readily acknowledge or 
discuss the history of government discrimination that aided in racially and eco-
nomically delineated metropolitan fragmentation.106  Consequently, “citizens may 
tend to view [the current] fiscal, economic, and social inequality [within metropol-
itan regions] as reflections of private choice and merit.”107  Many are also likely to 
view the racial and economic stratification of metropolitan areas and the accom-
panying inequalities as the natural order of things.108  Indeed, citizens arguably 
have a difficult time imagining a different distributional order.109  The result is that 
citizens are less likely to question stark inequalities within metropolitan areas, par-
ticularly to the extent that the inequalities exist along dimensions of race and class.  
They are also less likely to desire to take collective action to address inequalities or 
problems that affect the metropolitan region as a whole. 
II. FRAGMENTATION, EDUCATION, LOCALISM, AND REGIONAL 
DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Race and class delineated metropolitan fragmentation also affects school 
districts.  School districts are local governments.110  School district fragmentation 
  
moderate-income housing, housing that would probably be racially integrated.”  Id.; see also, e.g., 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that low- to moderate-income residents of the city 
of Rochester, New York were outsiders and lacked even the standing to challenge the exclusionary 
effects of the neighboring suburb Penfield’s zoning ordinance that limited the amount of affordable 
housing that could be built in Penfield). 
105. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 2024–27 
(arguing that metropolitan fragmentation inculcates a parochialism that not only discourages 
citizens from forming beneficial regional alliances but also institutionalizes the advantaged position 
of the wealthier, usually whiter, jurisdictions such that they come to believe that it is the natural 
order of things and are not inclined to question or challenge gross metropolitan inequalities). 
106. See id. at 2026; see also Powell, supra note 102 (suggesting that where one lives has important 
consequences for the distribution of opportunity in America and noting that a “myriad of public 
policies and private practices create these spatial opportunity structures and sort people into them”). 
107. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 2026. 
108. See id.; cf. Powell, supra note 102 (“It is critically important to appreciate that [segregation and 
inequality] are not natural.  Racial segregation was historically legislated, through direct and 
indirect means, into the very fabric of our communities.  And its legacy continues to undermine our 
individual and communal choices and our capacities to elevate ourselves and our neighborhoods.”). 
109. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and The Tyranny of The Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 2026. 
110. See, e.g., CHARLES J. RUSSO, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 167 (2012) (explaining that 
school boards are “creatures of the state” designed by legislatures to carry out their constitutional 
mandates to educate children entrusted to their care); Briffault, The Local School District, supra note 
18, at 25 (“[A] school district is a local government.”). 
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is the existence of multiple school districts within a metropolitan area.111  Just as 
local governments compete for residents, school districts also “compete for resi-
dents [who] shape their populations, tax bases and programs.”112  Thus, the same 
distributional inequities that plague general-purpose local governments also 
plague school districts.  As a result, neighboring school districts within metro-
politan areas offer disparate qualities of public education creating what this Arti-
cle refers to as regional inequalities in public education.  This Part describes the 
relationship between school district fragmentation and metropolitan fragmenta-
tion.  It analyzes how both forms of fragmentation create regional inequalities in 
public education.  It also discusses why such inequalities matter and analyzes how 
localism exacerbates the inequalities. 
A. School District Fragmentation and Metropolitan Fragmentation 
There are close to 13,000 independent school districts operating in the 
United States.113  Levels of school district fragmentation vary substantially across 
geographical regions within the United States.114  While school district frag-
mentation exists at different rates across the country, it exists at a significant 
enough level in every United States geographic region to raise concerns about 
how school district fragmentation collectively affects educational opportunities 
for all students.115 
For example, in a study of United States metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs),116 researchers found that the average level of fragmentation within the 
  
111. Jennifer J. Holme & Kara S. Finnigan, School Diversity, School District Fragmentation and 
Metropolitan Policy, TCHR. C. REC., Nov. 2013, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Holme & Finnigan, School 
Diversity]. 
112. Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 500. 
113. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEMS BY ENROLLMENT-SIZE GROUP AND STATE (2013), 
available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/COG/2012/ORG11.US01. 
114. Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 5. 
115. For example, even though the South has school district fragmentation at a lower rate than the 
national average, scholars have recognized that the problems created by school district 
fragmentation still significantly impact educational distributional opportunities and racial 
segregation in Southern school districts.  See, e.g., Erica Frankenberg, Splintering School Districts: 
Understanding the Link Between Segregation and Fragmentation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 869 
(2009) (examining how the creating of new school districts in Jefferson County, Alabama changed 
the nature of school segregation from intradistrict segregation to interdistrict segregation). 
116. A metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as a core area 
containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a high 
degree of economic and social integration with that core.  To be an MSA, an area must have at 
least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more inhabitants.  See Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical 
Areas Main, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2013), http://www.census.gov/population/metro. 
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MSAs studied was .72; meaning that a 72 percent probability existed that two 
randomly selected students within a metropolitan region would attend schools in 
different school districts.117  School district fragmentation is the highest in the 
Northeast at .862; meaning, there is an 86.2 percent chance that two randomly 
selected students within a metropolitan region in the Northeast will attend 
schools in different school districts.118  School district fragmentation is similarly 
high in the Midwest at .744 and lowest in the West and South at .691 and .650, 
respectively.119 
Significantly, metropolitan regions with high levels of school district frag-
mentation are the most likely to have severe racial segregation in their schools.120    
In contrast, larger school districts located in metropolitan areas with less frag-
mentation have less racial segregation because they have a larger base of more di-
verse students from which they can draw.121  Further, the more fragmented 
general-purpose local governments are within a metropolitan area, the more like-
ly school districts within that metropolitan area are to be highly fragmented.122  
  
117. Bischoff, supra note 41, at 196–97. 
118. Id. at 197–98.  It is worth noting that of all the MSAs studied, the MSA with the highest level of 
school district fragmentation was located in the Northeast—Nassau-Suffolk, New York, which 
had a fragmentation level of .986, meaning that there is a 98.6 percent chance that two randomly 
selected students in that area will attend different school districts.  Id. at 197. 
119. Id. at 197–98.  Levels of fragmentation in the various United States geographical regions are a 
product of the state laws related to government formation and in the case of the South its history of 
running dual school systems because of de jure school segregation.  For example, the Northeast and 
Midwest likely have higher levels of school district fragmentation because historically the laws 
regarding local government formation in those states favored incorporation of suburbs into 
independent municipalities with their own independent suburban school districts as well.  See 
William A. Fischel, The Congruence of American School Districts With Other Local Government 
Boundaries: A Google-Earth Exploration 20–23 (Apr. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (describing 
the laws related to school district formation in the Northeast and Midwest and noting that the 
“town remains the sacrosanct atom for school districts in New England” and that the Midwest 
initially followed the New England model as well); Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 
111, at 5.  The South on the other hand has county-based school systems, which means less school 
district fragmentation because the county became the traditional unit of governance in light of the 
racially segregated system of education implemented in the South.  See Fischel, supra note 119, at 
24 (noting that after the Civil War the South set up separate subcounty districts for schools 
between blacks and whites). 
120. See Batchis, supra note 22, at 98 (summarizing the findings of a study that showed that areas with 
small school districts and high levels of school district fragmentation were also likely to have high 
levels of racial segregation in their schools); Charles T. Clotfelter, Public School Segregation in 
Metropolitan Areas, 75 LAND ECONOMICS 502, 502–503 (1999) (concluding that regional 
differences in levels of metropolitan fragmentation results in high levels of residential segregation 
which in turn accounts for metropolitan area school segregation).   
121. See Clotfelter, supra, note 120, at 503 (finding that larger districts are less segregated because they 
“allow the possibility of mixing students from diverse neighborhoods”).   
122. For example, states in the Northeast and Midwest have the highest levels of municipal 
fragmentation.  Similarly, “[s]chool districts [are] more likely to be coterminous with city boundaries 
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Moreover, “[t]he relationship between municipal boundaries and school district 
boundaries has a direct bearing on levels of school segregation and on the fiscal 
condition of . . . school districts . . . .”123  This is the case because the policies 
adopted by municipalities, particularly regarding land use, influence the racial 
composition and socioeconomic status of the residents the school districts will 
draw from.124 
Simply put, the combination of metropolitan fragmentation and school dis-
trict fragmentation within a metropolitan region increases the probability that 
school districts will be racially and economically segregated, have varying levels of 
student needs and disparate tax bases with which to work.125  This in turn leads to 
regional inequalities in public education insofar as localities with more middle-
class and typically white students have higher tax bases to draw from, are able to 
offer higher qualities of education, and have higher levels of academic success.126  
The converse is true for localities with more poor and minority students that have 
lower tax bases to draw from, offer lower qualities of education, and have lower 
levels of academic success.127 
B. The Significance of Regional Inequalities in Public Education 
The aforementioned regional inequalities in public education matter from 
an economic perspective and from a social equality perspective.  Economically, 
metropolitan regions are assuming “greater significance in local, national and 
world affairs.”128  Indeed, many consider regions or metropolitan areas the prem-
ier unit of competition in the new global economy.129  People today live their lives 
  
in the upper midwestern states and the Northeast,” and thus  show the highest levels of fragmentation.  
Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 8. 
123. Id. 
124. See id. at 7–8. 
125. See id. at 8. 
126. See, e.g., Margaret C. Hobday, Geneva Finn & Myron Orfield, A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota’s 
Failed Experiment With Choice-Based Integration, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 936, 949–51 
(2009) (describing the trends of urban and suburban student enrollment in the Minneapolis region 
and noting that the trend of concentrated poverty and racial segregation in urban schools negatively 
impacts student life outcomes); Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 502–07 (describing 
interjurisdictional variation between school districts as characterized by fiscal disparities racial 
disparities, and achievement disparities). 
127. See Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 502–07. 
128. KATHRYN A. FOSTER, REGIONALISM ON PURPOSE 4 (2001). 
129. Id. (noting that regions are viewed as the premier unit of competition in a global economy); 
Griffith, supra note 34, at 511 (arguing that the “increasing globalization of the economy has 
transformed metropolitan regions throughout the world into cohesive economic units,” and that 
“[o]ur artificial political boundaries were formed during an era in which travel times were 
considerably longer than those at present; economic activity today cuts across these local 
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on a regional rather than local scale.  They cross jurisdiction boundary lines for 
activities including working, shopping, and entertainment.130  Thus, to the extent 
that an educated workforce is a prerequisite for economic growth,131 inequalities 
between neighboring school districts within metropolitan areas have significant 
implications for the overall economic well-being of metropolitan regions. 
By restricting high-quality public education to only a subset of the metro-
politan region, metropolitan areas breed a shallow labor pool that will, in the end, 
make them less competitive in the new global economy.132  Indeed, scholars have 
noted that because “of the growing number of minority students in public 
schools, if existing educational trends continue, the nation risks something it has 
never before seen: an intergenerational decline in its educational level, a threaten-
ing outcome in a knowledge-based, global economy.”133 
Further, continued racial and economic segregation perpetuates social ine-
quality.  Other scholars have written about the deleterious social effects of racially 
and economically segregated education.134  Most notably, students who attend 
racially and economically segregated schools receive a qualitatively inferior educa-
tion, which reduces their social mobility and loosens their connections to critical 
social networks.135  As a result, such individuals are likely to be disaffected citizens 
  
jurisdiction lines”).  But cf. Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 13–14 
(2000) (suggesting that the argument, regional units are the new unit of economic competition, is 
controversial because “[a]lthough there is evidence that rates of regional growth are inversely 
correlated with the severity of intraregional disparities, correlation is not causation,” but 
acknowledging that the economic competitiveness argument is a significant one in the regionalism 
literature). 
130. FOSTER, supra note 128, at 4; see Griffith, supra note 34, at 512. 
131. ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. & THE 
WORKFORCE, HELP WANTED: PROJECTIONS OF JOBS AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS 
THROUGH 2018 (2010) (documenting the ways in which higher levels of education will shape the 
job opportunities available to workers). 
132. See David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 
BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1169 (2008) (“Metropolitan areas that continue to embrace localism at the 
expense of shared regional responsibilities tend to be less competitive in attracting economic 
development, keeping businesses and jobs, and maintaining a deep and talented labor pool.”). 
133. See Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 and 05-
915), 2006 WL 2927079 [hereinafter Brief of 553 Social Scientists]. 
134. For a comprehensive examination of the negative effects of racially and economically segregated 
schools, see GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., 
WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY (2005), and see 
also Brief of 553 Social Scientists, supra note 133, at 10–12. 
135. See Amy Stuart Wells, The “Consequences” of School Desegregation: The Mismatch Between the Research 
and the Rationale, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 789–90 (2001) (describing the negative effects 
of racially and economically isolated schools); id. (“Educational institutions acquire their status 
from their students, and those that serve only high-status students are better connected to the high-
status colleges and well-paying employers.  This reality contributes to a vicious cycle of poverty and 
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because their poor education denied them the benefits of social mobility.  There-
fore, they are more likely to engage in social ills such as crime and malfeasance.136  
To that end, as the racial demographics shift America closer to a majority minori-
ty country,137 the costs of “continuing to maintain [racially and economically] 
segregated schools and failing to properly educate poor and minority students will 
be borne not only by the individual students but also by society as a whole.”138 
C. The Role of Localism in Creating Regional Inequalities  
in Public Education 
As a matter of legal theory, school districts are creatures of the state.139  
They possess only the powers afforded to them by the state and exist to imple-
ment the “state’s education mandate locally.”140  The reality of school district au-
thority however, diverges greatly from the legal theory of limited school district 
authority.  As I note in a previous article, in practice there is a strong preference 
for localism or local control of public education.141  While scholars have long 
documented the nebulous definition of local control in the education context,142 
  
despair for those in low-status urban schools.  It leads to the anger and violence of teenagers who 
consciously and subconsciously know they have been excommunicated from opportunity.  It leads 
to the self-fulfilling prophecy of inner-city schools as a place where failure is virtually assured.”). 
136. See Erik Thorbecke & Chutatong Charumilind, Economic Inequality and Its Socioeconomic Impact, 
30 WORLD DEV. 1477, 1495 (2002) (explaining that income inequality reduces social capital and 
increases the probability that those on the lower end of the economic spectrum will commit crime 
because “the alternative to crime is less attractive . . . and the potential proceeds from crime are 
greater”).  Furthermore, “[a] rise in inequality may also have a crime-inducing effect by reducing 
the individual’s moral threshold . . . .”  Id. 
137. See Sabrina Tavernise, Whites Account for Under Half of Births in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/us/whites-account-for-under-half-of-births-in-us.html? 
pagewanted=all (describing the most recent results from a U.S. Census Bureau study, which 
showed that white births are no longer a majority in the United States, and noting that this 
demographic shift raises important policy questions including those related to education because 
the United States has a “spotty record of educating minority youth”). 
138. Erika K. Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No Child Left 
Behind Act Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 649 (2011). 
139. See, e.g., Gragg v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 287, 627 P.2d 335, 338 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (“A school 
district is an arm of the state existing only as a creature of the legislature to operate as a political 
subdivision of the state.  A school district has only such power and authority as is granted by the 
legislature . . . .” (quoting Wichita Pub. Sch. Emps. Union v. Smith, 397 P.2d 357 (Kan. 1964))). 
140. See Briffault, The Local School District, supra note 18, at 30. 
141. Wilson, supra note 138, at 636–44 (describing the doctrinal preference for local control of schools 
by the Supreme Court); see also City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 62 (R.I. 1995) 
(holding that the preservation of local control is a legitimate state interest and the Rhode Island 
system for financing public schools was rationally related to that legitimate interest). 
142. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 
773 (1992) (describing the varied meanings attached to local control in the school finance context). 
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this Article suggests that a fair reading of the term, as it is applied in case law, is 
that school districts are afforded broad fiscal and political autonomy.  Though 
the amount of fiscal and political autonomy afforded school districts varies from 
state to state, school districts and their governing bodies, school boards, for the 
most part have broad authority to raise and spend revenue for the benefit of their 
students,143 assign students to schools,144 and make education related policy de-
cisions.145 
Because local school districts are afforded broad fiscal and political autono-
my, they are permitted to function in practice as if they were sovereign entities, 
even though they are not according to the actual strictures of state law.  Put an-
other way, in practice, local school districts—and not the state—bear the primary 
responsibility for educating students within their geographic boundaries.146  Im-
portantly, federal and state court decisions reinforce the practical sovereignty of 
school districts in ways that perpetuate race- and class-based inequalities in edu-
cation. 
For example, court decisions have relied on the importance of local control 
and the purported autonomy of school districts in declining to abrogate school dis-
trict boundary lines in order to desegregate schools.  In the seminal case Milliken v. 
Bradley, the Supreme Court did not disturb the trial court’s finding that racial seg-
regation within the Detroit public school system was the result of intentional dis-
  
143. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1010, 1023–24 (Colo. 1982) (finding 
that the Colorado’s school financing scheme, which called for 47 percent of school funding to be 
derived from local property taxes, was constitutional where the purpose of the legislation was to 
afford local control to school districts to determine “how much money should be raised for the local 
schools, and how that money should be spent”); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 580–81 (Wis. 
1989) (using local control as a basis for upholding the constitutionality of a school financing 
system). 
144. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (plurality opinion) (noting the 
broad authority that school boards have to assign students to schools, including strategic site 
selections for schools and drawing attendance zones with the racial demographics of the 
neighborhood in mind). 
145. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); Dawson v. E. 
Side Union High Sch. Dist., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 115–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding the 
legality of a contract between the East Side Union High School District and a television company 
involving a video program shown to students in classrooms which contains commercial 
advertising).  In Dawson, the court reasoned that the California constitution and state legislature 
afforded local school districts broad power to choose instructional materials and courts should 
intervene only when there is a clear case of abuse of discretion by the local school district.  Id. 
146. See Kiel, supra note 6, at 145 (“[D]istrict sovereignty as it currently functions assures that 
geographic residence will be the primary factor in determining which school a child attends.  
Access to schools outside of a student’s geographic reach is limited or non-existent.”). 
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crimination.147  The Court also acknowledged the high concentration of Black 
students and low concentration of white students in the Detroit public school sys-
tem.148  The Court nonetheless relied on the purported importance of local control 
and autonomy of school districts in finding that an interdistrict remedy between 
the Detroit school system and the surrounding suburban school districts was un-
constitutional.149  The Court reasoned: 
[S]chool district lines may [not] be casually ignored or treated as a 
mere administrative convenience . . . [because] [n]o single tradition in 
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the op-
eration of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential 
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public 
schools and to quality of the educational process.150 
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have subsequently used similar rea-
soning in other cases to strike down interdistrict desegregation plans.151 
The Supreme Court also relied on principles of localism and school district 
autonomy in declining to outlaw local property tax based funding schemes that 
create extreme funding disparities between neighboring school districts.  Most 
notably, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a local property tax based school financing scheme that re-
sulted in gross funding disparities between neighboring school districts, reason-
ing that “local control means . . . the freedom to devote more money to the 
education of one's children.”152  A number of state courts have followed suit, also 
finding that local property tax based school financing schemes that result in fiscal 
disparities between neighboring school districts do not violate state constitutional 
provisions.153 
  
147. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (“The record before us . . . contains evidence of de 
jure segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools . . . .”). 
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 752–53. 
150. Id. at 741–42. 
151. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (finding that a desegregation order imposed by a 
district court that sought to attract nonminority students from outside school districts to schools 
within the district was beyond the scope of the court’s remedial authority and that the proper 
remedy would have been an intradistrict remedy); Bronson v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of 
Cincinnati, 578 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (declining to order an interdistrict 
desegregation remedy between the Cincinnati school district and suburban districts reasoning that 
“Ohio's local school districts are in fact separate and autonomous entities comparable in their level 
of independence and in the extent of their local control to the school districts considered by the 
Court in Milliken”).   
152. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973). 
153. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1010, 1023–24 (Colo. 1982) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a school financing system in which 47 percent of the funds for 
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From an educational equity perspective, federal and state court reliance on 
education localism to reify the practical sovereignty of school districts has allowed 
“local rights” to replace “states’ rights” as a vehicle to preclude states from having 
to provide substantive educational equality to poor and minority students.154  As a 
result, school districts are able to function as their own fiefdoms, providing dis-
parate education along the lines of race and class without consequence. 
D. Regional Inequalities Between School Districts: What it Looks Like 
The combination of fragmentation and localism creates significant dispari-
ties between neighboring school districts within metropolitan areas.  The dis-
parities play out in three notable ways.  First, despite the moderate success of 
school finance litigation in some jurisdictions,155 gross fiscal disparities persist 
between neighboring school districts.156  School districts levy taxes on property 
  
public education were derived from local property taxes which created fiscal disparities between 
school districts with wealthier and poorer tax bases); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 
(Ga. 1981) (finding that spending disparities between school districts were rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental objective of local control); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 458 
A.2d 758, 788–89 (Md. 1983) (noting that the Maryland legislature shared the view of local 
control articulated by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez and Milliken and upholding local property 
tax based school financing scheme). 
154. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., The Ugly Side of the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/opinion/25herbert.html?_r=0 (documenting a speech by 
presidential adviser Lee Atwater in using “states’ rights” and other euphemisms as a proxy for racial 
discrimination and quoting Atwater as saying: “‘You start out in 1954 by saying, ‘Nigger, nigger, 
nigger.’ . . . By 1968, you can’t say ‘nigger’—that hurts you.  Backfires.  So you say stuff like forced 
busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff.  You’re getting so abstract now [that] you’re talking about 
cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things, and a byproduct 
of them is [that] Blacks get hurt worse than whites.’”). 
155. School finance cases in which plaintiffs have bought suits under state constitutional provisions 
related to the state’s constitutionally stated obligation to provide education have in some instances 
proved successful in getting states to contribute more money to the funding of public schools and in 
increasing the amount of money spent on students in school districts with poorer tax bases.  See, 
e.g., Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004) (finding that the state’s 
method of funding and providing for individual school districts was such that it did not afford all 
students their state constitutional right to an opportunity to obtain sound basic education).  For a 
comprehensive account of school finance litigation and its impacts on school equity, see Michael 
Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity 
Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543 (1998). 
156. See JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND 
THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 127 (2010) (noting 
that “[t]he disparities in spending . . . [between school districts] have traditionally been severe, with 
some districts spending two, three, or even ten times more per pupil than others”); Laurie 
Reynolds, Skybox Schools: Public Education as Private Luxury, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 755 (2004) 
[hereinafter Reynolds, Skybox Schools] (chronicling the funding disparities between wealthy and 
poor districts). 
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that lies within their boundaries and, for the most part, use all of that money to 
fund their own schools.157  The amount of money that school districts can raise 
for funding their schools depends on “the tax rate levied [by the school district] 
and the value of the property within the taxing district’s boundaries.”158  School 
districts that encompass higher valued property can levy taxes at a lower rate yet 
still collect large sums of money while school districts that encompass lower val-
ued property must levy taxes at a higher rate but still collect less money, thereby 
allowing fiscal disparities between districts to persist.159 
Further, when state courts require equalization of funding across school 
districts, they also leave local school districts with the authority to tax themselves 
at higher rates and to provide funding at levels above the state mandated equal-
ized level, thereby allowing fiscal disparities between poor and wealthy districts 
to persist.160  Significantly, financial disparities between school districts matter.  
Although the relationship between school funding and academic achievement is 
undoubtedly complex and subject to much debate,161 a consistent body of re-
search has shown that school districts with more money are able to provide more 
challenging curriculum and other educational inputs that significantly impact 
student achievement.162 
  
157. See Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 502; cf. Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra note 156, at 
788 (describing school funding statutes known as “Robin Hood” statutes in Vermont and Texas in 
the which the states “explicitly seize property tax revenues and redistribute them (or force the local 
school district itself to distribute them) to districts with less property wealth. . . . [I]n both statutory 
schemes the poorer districts’ enhanced state aid comes directly from the wealthy districts, with no 
substantial additional state aid”). 
158. Reynolds, Skybox Schools, supra note 156, at 757. 
159. Id. 
160. See RYAN, supra note 156, at 128–29 (describing state funding equalization methods and focusing 
on a funding mechanism known as the foundation program).  Through the foundation program, 
states determine a minimum amount of money per pupil required to provide students with an 
adequate education and determine how much each district is required to pay towards the 
foundation amount.  The state contributes some portion of the foundation amount and determines 
the tax rate each district will assess in order to meet its required portion of the foundation amount.  
But states also allow districts to levy a higher tax rate and to spend more per pupil than the 
foundation program minimum floor.  Id. 
161. See, e.g., Marta Elliott, School Finance and Opportunities to Learn: Does Money Well Spent Enhance 
Students’ Achievement?, 71 SOC. OF EDUC. 223 (1998) (finding that per-pupil expenditures 
indirectly increase students’ achievement by giving them access to educated teachers who use 
effective pedagogies in the classroom).  But cf.  Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance Reform May 
Not be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991) (concluding “there is no systematic 
relationship between school expenditures and student performance”). 
162. See Return on Educational Investment: Background Info, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education/news/2011/01/19/8878/return-on-education 
al-investment-background-info. 
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Second, adherence to localism in education incentivizes a perverse type of 
community building that allows high-quality school districts to exclude minori-
ties and poor students through race- and class-neutral means.  While local gov-
ernment boundary lines are racially stratified, racial stratification along school 
district boundary lines is particularly acute.163  Indeed, since the Court’s decision 
in Brown, outlawing segregation in schools, “the territorially sovereign district, 
responsible only for its own resident students and not those nearby, has been a 
preeminent tool for resisting the racial integration of schools.”164  The race-
neutral land use policies that result in racial and economic stratification of met-
ropolitan areas result in similar stratification along school district boundary 
lines.165  In the school district context, officials use race-neutral land use policies 
to create homogeneous school districts that the Court in Brown outlawed.  
While many parents profess a desire to send their children to racially and eco-
nomically diverse schools, they also fervently defend localist policies that main-
tain neighborhood schools and resist efforts to disrupt the connection between 
housing and schools.166  Thus, while one of the virtues of localism is that it facili-
tates community building, officials use localism, in the education context, to 
build racially (and economically) homogenous school communities. 
Finally, interlocal competition for residents strengthens wealthy white 
school districts while weakening poorer minority districts.  Simply put, 
“[b]ecause a municipality’s property taxes typically play a significant role in 
funding education, jurisdictions with higher property values . . . are much better 
positioned” to compete for middle-class students.167  The parents of white, 
middle-class, or upper-class students are the most likely to be in a position to 
exercise their Tieboutian choice to relocate to a municipality with high property 
values and a sufficient tax base to fund a high-quality school district.168  Con-
versely, poor and minority parents are unlikely to be able to change residence in 
order to change their children’s quality of education.169  As a result, school dis-
  
163. See Kiel, supra note 6, at 156; Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 506. 
164. Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 504; see also Batchis, supra note 22, at 98 (describing the 
connection between local control and resistance to school desegregation efforts). 
165. See supra Part II.B. 
166. See Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the Social Construction of 
School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 177, 182–83 (2002) [hereinafter Jellison Holme, Buying 
Homes, Buying Schools]. 
167. Batchis, supra note 22, at 97. 
168. See generally Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools, supra note 166, at 177–78 (describing 
the ability of high-income parents to access high-quality schools by moving into a school district 
with good schools).   
169. Wilson, supra note 138, at 635. 
Regionalism in Public Education 1447 
 
tricts situated in municipalities with high property values and an ample tax base 
have a significant advantage in luring middle-class students to their schools.170 
Further, the congregation of predominately middle- or upper-class students 
in one district and low-income students in another creates qualitative disparities 
between school districts.  A significant achievement gap exists between low-
income and middle-class or upper-middle-class districts.171  Poor, predominately 
minority school districts are more likely to have a plethora of failing schools 
where students are unable to meet minimum state testing requirements.172  
Scholars have demonstrated that part of the reason for this is that middle-class 
and upper-class students are a valuable resource that enhances the learning envi-
ronment for all students.173  Because of the environment from which they come, 
“middle- and high-income students tend to bring more educational capital to 
school and, thus, elevate the learning of those around them.”174  Poor, predomi-
nately minority school districts do not have this resource.  Middle- and upper-
class parents recognize this, and therefore seek to enroll their children in school 
districts that have a plethora of middle- and upper-class students.175  Thus, dis-
tricts that are more affluent have yet another advantage over poorer districts in 
the interlocal competition for students. 
  
170. Indeed, the status associated with the amount of money per pupil a school district spends on its 
students combined with the type of students the district serves, heavily influences parents’ decisions 
about where to locate for purposes of sending their children to school.  See Jellison Holme, Buying 
Homes, Buying Schools, supra note 166, at 180 (“[P]arents in this study assumed that those schools 
serving the children of high-status parents . . . were superior to those serving the children of lower-
status parents . . . . [T]he assumed quality of the schools was directly associated with the status of 
the families they served.”). 
171. JONATHAN ROTHWELL, HOUSING COSTS, ZONING, AND ACCESS TO HIGH-SCORING 
SCHOOLS 12 (2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/ 
2012/4/19%20school%20inequality%20rothwell/0419_school_inequality_rothwell.pdf (finding 
that “[v]ariation in metropolitan income inequality and demographic diversity contributes to the 
variation in school test-score gaps across metro areas,” and that “[m]etro areas with high income 
inequality and high median incomes tend to have significantly larger test-score gaps”). 
172. See RYAN, supra note 156, at 157 (“High-poverty schools, especially high-poverty urban schools, 
almost always have lower levels of academic achievement than low-poverty schools, regardless of 
funding levels.”). 
173. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional Right 
to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373 (2012) (putting forth a theory of equal access to quality 
education for poor students through economic desegregation efforts on the grounds that middle-
class peers are an educational resource that poor students need in order to excel academically). 
174. Id. at 409; see also RYAN, supra note 156, at 165 (describing research demonstrating that the 
socioeconomic status of a student’s peers heavily influences student academic performance and 
noting that students conform to the dominant culture within the school).  Schools that are 
majority poor and urban lack the influence of middle-class students who bring a culture of 
achievement.  Id.  Instead, a culture in which expectations and motivations for academic success 
are lower dominates.  Id. 
175. See Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools, supra note 166, at 201–02. 
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Notably, some scholars suggest that the primacy of localism and practical 
school district sovereignty in perpetuating educational inequalities may be erod-
ing.176  In making this suggestion, they point to various education reforms such as 
greater accountability measures being imposed on local school districts by the 
federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and by states through the enactment 
of rigorous academic standards and harsh penalties for failing to meet those 
standards, including state takeovers or closures of failing schools.177  They also 
point to the success of adequacy-based school finance litigation in getting states 
to increase their share of public education funding in order to eliminate wealth 
disparities between school districts.178  Finally, they note that the proliferation of 
private market forces such as vouchers and charter schools enables parents to se-
lect schools and therefore lessens the importance of school district boundary lines 
in determining what school a student attends.179 
To be sure, federal and state education reforms have partially reduced the 
practical sovereignty of school districts.  School districts no longer have a com-
plete monopoly on determining educational content, and state and federal gov-
ernments hold them more accountable for failing to meet standards.180  Yet, 
increased state and federal accountability has not generally improved the academ-
ic plight of poor, urban districts.181  Instead, poor, urban districts are more likely 
to be penalized for failing to meet federal NCLB requirements or state standards 
and are more likely to have schools closed down or taken over by the state.182  
Thus, to the extent these measures erode the practical sovereignty of school dis-
tricts and the primacy of localism in public education, it is uneven erosion with 
the salience of localism diminishing in poor, predominately minority urban dis-
  
176. See Briffault, The Local School District, supra note 18, at 52 (“Several recent developments have 
further challenged local control and the status of local school boards.”); Saiger, The Last Wave, supra 
note 24, at 873–88 (arguing that while local power remains substantial, school districts have lost 
their power to state agencies, the federal government, and constituent schools within the school 
districts). 
177. See Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 24, at 875–78. 
178. See id. at 896–98. 
179. See id. at 878–83. 
180. See id. at 875. 
181. See, e.g., Danielle Holley-Walker, Educating at the Crossroads: Parents Involved, No Child Left 
Behind and School Choice, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 911, 932–33 (2008) (noting that the majority of schools 
sanctioned under NCLB are predominantly minority, low-income, and located in metropolitan 
areas with high numbers of racially isolated schools). 
182. See id. 
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tricts while the autonomy of middle-class, predominately white districts remains 
unchanged.183 
Further, although successful school finance litigation caused many states to 
provide a higher share of public education funding, increased state funding has 
not ameliorated fiscal inequalities between school districts.  As noted earlier in 
the Article184, this is because even when courts require equalized state funding of 
schools, they have also permitted local districts to tax and spend above any basic 
level of funding provided by the state.185 
Finally, similar to federal and state education reforms, the proliferation of 
market based options for parents has weakened the effect of localism primarily on 
poor, predominately minority urban schools, not suburban schools.186  Most 
market based options such as school choice, vouchers, and minority students 
stuck in failing districts, not suburban students, primarily use charter schools.187  
Though there are challenges to localism in education, these challenges do not 
  
183. See Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 24, at 921–22 (acknowledging that accountability measures 
result in distressed districts losing autonomy, while the autonomy of suburban districts remains 
unchanged). 
184. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
185. For example, in Rose v. Council For Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), the 
Kentucky Supreme Court held that Kentucky’s system of common schools violated the state 
constitution.  The court found that the state failed to provide enough funding to the common 
schools to ensure that children were receiving an adequate level of education and ordered the state 
legislature to provide funding sufficient to provide each child in Kentucky an “equal opportunity to 
have an adequate education.”  Id. at 211–12.  Significantly, the court also held that school districts 
were free to “assess local ad valorem taxes on real property and personal property at a rate over and 
above that set by the General Assembly to fund the statewide system of common schools.”  Id. at 
212.  Courts in other jurisdictions have made similar findings.  See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. 
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 814–15 (Ariz. 1994) (finding that disparities caused by local 
control did not violate the state constitution, since a school district or a county can decide to pursue 
an educational system better than the general uniform system created by the state). 
186. See, e.g., BRIAN GILL ET AL., RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT 
WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT VOUCHERS AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 160 (2007) (conducting 
an extensive study of the demographics of voucher holders and charter school attendees and noting 
that “[i]n most cities, minority racial/ethnic groups have been heavily represented in voucher 
programs”); Julia Schwenkenberg & James VanderHoff, Why Do Charter Schools Fail?—An 
Analysis of Charter School Survival in New Jersey 11 (Rutgers University, Newark, Working Paper 
No. 2013-002) (noting that poor minority students are more likely than white students or middle-
class students to attend charter schools in New Jersey). 
187. See, e.g., BRIAN GILL ET AL., supra note 186, at 170 (“Most of the existing targeted voucher 
programs . . . serve relatively low-achieving students; there is no evidence that voucher schools are 
‘creaming’ high achieving students from public schools.”); CTR FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. 
OUTCOMES, NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOL STUDY 82 (2013), available at http://credo. 
stanford.edu/documents/NCSS%202013%20Final%20Draft.pdf (concluding that the percentage 
of Black and socioeconomically disadvantaged students that enroll in charter schools is higher than 
the percentage of Black and socioeconomically disadvantaged students enrolled in traditional 
public schools). 
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thwart race- and class-based inequalities between school districts.  Consequently, 
adherence to education localism remains a key component in the creation of re-
gional inequalities in public education. 
III. REGIONALISM: USING CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL COLLABORATION 
TO AMELIORATE METROPOLITAN DISPARITIES BETWEEN  
SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
As discussed in the previous two Parts, inequalities between neighboring lo-
calities and school districts are in many ways a result of the preference for decen-
tralized autonomous local governance structures.  Indeed, because of the locally 
bounded nature of the powers of general-purpose governments and school dis-
tricts, such entities often act in isolation, neglecting to reflect the economically 
and socially interdependent nature of the metropolitan region as a whole.188 
In order to mitigate inequalities between localities, scholars look to a theory 
of governance called regionalism as a possible solution for general-purpose local 
governments but not school districts.  This Part suggests that we should consider 
regionalism as a solution to distributional disparities in public education between 
school districts.  It examines the broader regionalism doctrine and takes the posi-
tion that metropolitan fragmentation and exclusively relying on localist educa-
tional governance structures create serious race- and class-based inequalities in 
public education.  Such disparities will persist if we continue to disseminate pub-
lic education solely on a local basis rather than a regional basis. 
A. The Normative Argument for Shifting Away From Localism in Public 
Education and Toward Regionalism 
Public education plays a critical role in the maintenance of American de-
mocracy.189  Scholars champion localism in education on the same democracy 
related grounds used in support of the broader localism doctrine: citizen partici-
pation and community building.190  Allegedly, a more centralized system of dis-
  
188. See Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 27, at 1129–30 (1996) 
(describing the ways in which local government regulatory powers and service provision 
requirements are confined within the locality’s borders). 
189. See Saiger, Boundary Problem, supra note 2, at 521 (“[M]any political theorists understand education 
and self-government as symbiotic processes by which people create and maintain good societies.”). 
190. See PEDRO NOGUERA, CITY SCHOOLS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: RECLAIMING THE 
PROMISE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 84–85 (2003) (citing the prevalence of local control and 
decentralization of public education in the United States as rooted in a perception that such a 
governance structure is inherently more democratic than a centralized system of education).  
Efficiency is also used as a justification for local control of schools, particularly that allowing parents 
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seminating public education is undesirable because it would be bureaucratic and 
as a result less responsive to the needs and desires of parents within the local 
community.191  A more decentralized system of public education on the other 
hand is purportedly geographically and politically closer to the people, more re-
sponsive to their needs and therefore more likely to inspire citizen participation 
in educational matters.192  In addition, scholars also defend localism in public 
education on the grounds that it facilitates a type of community building that is 
purportedly essential to building the type of social capital and networks that are 
necessary in a successful democracy.193  In particular, scholars suggest that local-
ism allows parents to be more involved with their children’s education by building 
relationships with their teachers, classmates and having a better understanding of 
the child’s daily school experience.194 
Yet the value of localism in public education, particularly with respect to its 
capacity to enhance democracy through citizen participation and community 
building, is overstated.195  Despite the smaller and geographically closer units of 
school governance, participation levels in school governance, including election 
  
to compare localities that offer educational services that meets their needs breeds competition 
amongst school districts, which makes school districts more efficient.  See San Antonio Ind. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (asserting that local control of schools breeds efficiency 
because by allowing “[e]ach locality . . . to tailor local programs to local needs . . . [p]luralism . . . 
affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for 
educational excellence”).  But cf. Wilson, supra note 138, at 633–34 (describing the efficiency 
justification for localism in public education as flawed because of the lack of mobility of poor 
parents and their inability to exercise any real choice since they cannot afford to change residences 
as a means of shopping for a locality that best meets their children’s educational needs). 
191. See KATHRYN A. MCDERMOTT, CONTROLLING PUBLIC EDUCATION: LOCALISM VERSUS 
EQUITY 16 (1999) (“Support for local control [of education] may be motivated by a belief that 
decisions made closer to schools and classrooms are better than those made and implemented by a 
hierarchal bureaucracy.”); NOGUERA, supra note 190, at 85 (“Local governance of public schools 
ostensibly serves as a means to ensure that schools are responsive and accountable to the 
communities they serve.”). 
192. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 124 (noting that because local institutions are closer to the 
people geographically and that the smaller the decisionmaking body, the larger the number of people 
who will be involved in state or citywide school governance). 
193. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (“[L]ocal autonomy has long been thought 
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to 
quality of the educational process.”); MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 121 (conceding that local 
administration of public education reinforces a sense of community); Saiger, Boundary Problem, 
supra note 2, at 519–20 (describing the importance of local control in building social networks and 
capital in a community because of the high level of interactions that parents and students have with 
school teachers and administrators). 
194. Id. at 520. 
195. See Wilson, supra note 138, at 632–34 (debunking the notion that decentralization leads to higher 
levels of citizen participation in public school governance). 
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of school board members and participation in school board meetings, are low.196  
Moreover, even when citizens do attempt to participate in board of education 
meetings, many officials structure board meetings such that the opportunity for 
public discussion is limited and any public discussion that does occur typically 
does not relate to or influence board decisions.197  Most importantly, as critics of 
the citizen participation justification for the broader localism doctrine have 
pointed out, citizen participation is meaningless if the citizens within a locality 
lack the financial or political wherewithal to translate citizen participation into 
policy that meets the citizens’ needs and desires.198 
Further, the community building that localism facilitates is neither broad 
nor inclusive.199  Instead, because of the racially and economically stratified nature 
of the larger localities in which school districts are situated, the sense of commu-
nity that educational localism breeds is “quite narrow both geographically and po-
litically.”200  The community building rational for localism allows residents who 
live in high-quality school districts to develop a very narrow sense of the purpose 
of public education.  They come to view public education as just another consum-
able good for those who can afford to move into a high-quality school district.201  
In conceptualizing public education as a consumable good, as demonstrated by 
the Williams-Bolar case, these residents believe that they have the right to ex-
clude nonpayers or nonresidents from consuming the same public education that 
the residents paid to consume.202  This type of community building stratifies, ra-
ther than enhances democracy. 
  
196. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 55 (finding that in many communities, school board candidates 
are elected unopposed and that turnout for school board elections is as low as, if not lower, than other 
local elections); NOGUERA, supra note 190, at 85 (noting that low levels of community participation 
in schools follows trends that are similar to other forms of civic engagement). 
197. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 60–67 (studying the structure of board of education 
meetings in various communities and concluding that most of the deliberations on substantive 
education policy issues occurs in special meetings, leaving larger meetings open to the public largely 
for ceremonial functions).  The study also noted that most of the people who attended and 
commented at meetings open to the public were school principals or other school district 
employees and that the public comments made at the meetings rarely related to the items actually 
on the board agendas.  Id. 
198. See NOGUERA, supra note 190, at 83 (“Concentrated poverty and racial segregation limit the 
ability of parents to exert control over the schools that serve their children, and educational leaders 
in such communities often lack the resources to take on the task themselves.”); Wilson, supra note 
138, at 635. 
199. See supra Part II. 
200. MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 121. 
201. See Batchis, supra note 22, at 98; David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American 
Struggle Over Educational Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39 (1997). 
202. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Beverly Hills Schools to Cut Nonresidents, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/education/21beverly.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Beverly 
Hills school board vice president Lisa Korbatov on the district’s decision to eliminate slots for 
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Thus, in practice, the democratic-based rationales for the strong ideological 
commitment to localism in education do not bear out.  Instead, the strong ideo-
logical preference for localism is arguably a post hoc rationalization for discrimi-
nation and exclusion.203  Put another way, localism in education is in many ways 
nothing more than a rhetorical device used to enable localities to legally maintain 
racially and economically homogenous schools notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Brown.204  This point is particularly poignant given the stark 
resistance to school desegregation post–Brown,205 and the ostensibly politically 
motivated decision in Milliken to preclude interdistrict desegregation plans, 
which was a sharp departure from the Court’s previous rulings on school desegre-
gation.206 
To be fair, we should not reject localism in education all together.  Localism 
has positive benefits such as making it geographically easier for citizens to be in-
volved in their children’s education and to respond to citizen preference.207  Thus, 
localism in and of itself is not problematic.  Rather, the reliance on localism as a 
defensive mechanism to prevent an equitable and efficient sharing of educational 
opportunity and resources is problematic.  In some instances, shifting away from 
a sole reliance on localism and integrating regionalism in the form of interdistrict 
collaboration will more evenly distribute educational opportunities, increase di-
versity in schools, and improve efficiency.  As racial segregation in schools reaches 
pre–Brown levels, and economic segregation in schools similarly intensifies,208 the 
  
students who do not reside in the district).  Specifically, Lisa Korbatov stated, “Membership has its 
privileges . . . . [b]ut anyone can be a member.  I made a choice to spend more to live in a home here 
when I could have spent less on a bigger home in another area. . . . [c]ity services . . . be they fire, 
police, schools, are reserved for residents and their children.”).  Id. 
203. See generally Troutt, supra note 132 (suggesting that localism generally is invoked as subterfuge for 
racial exclusion and protection of white privilege). 
204. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 16 (noting 
that support for local control of education is at times motivated by wealthier localities’ desire to not 
have to deal with the problems facing poorer districts). 
205. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The 
Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1603 (2003) (describing resistance to desegregating schools 
after Brown and noting that ten years after the decision, only 1.2 percent of Black students in the 
South attended integrated schools). 
206. See James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice and the Suburban Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635, 1645–46 
(2004) (suggesting that the Court’s decision in Milliken to deviate from its previously aggressive 
interpretation of the remedial scope of the Court’s powers in school desegregation cases may have 
been a result of political influence).  Further, Ryan reasons that “[p]ublic sentiment at the time was 
strongly opposed to cross-district busing.  President Nixon delivered a televised address specifically 
to denounce cross-district busing, and politicians from both sides of the aisle introduced measures, 
prior to Milliken, to prohibit it.”  Id.   (footnotes omitted). 
207. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 122. 
208. See, e.g., GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY ET AL., MILES TO GO: A REPORT ON SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA, 1989–2010, at 1 (2013) (describing the increasing racial diversity 
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time has come to reconceptualize our vision of public education in America.  Re-
gionalist governance structures offer one such possibility for doing so.  The Sub-
parts that follow demonstrate the possibilities of integrating more regionalist 
frameworks in public education. 
B. Regionalism in Public Education 
Regionalism is loosely defined as a theory that advocates for the creation of 
“regional [government] or regional governance structures that wield powers over 
policy areas that transcend local borders.”209  This Article takes the position that 
regionalism offers an attractive possibility for increasing efficiency and equity in 
public education.  Notably, regionalism in public education offers the most 
promise for improving efficiency and equity in highly fragmented metropolitan 
areas with urban cores, rather than rural districts.  This Subpart examines the 
broader theories of regionalism and examines the possibilities and obstacles to 
implementing regionalism in public education, particularly in highly fragmented 
urban metropolitan areas. 
1. Forms of Regionalism 
Two distinct doctrinal branches of regionalism exist: traditional regional-
ism and new regionalism.  Traditional regionalism advocates for the centraliza-
tion or consolidation of government authority into a regional government.210  
More specifically, traditional regionalism calls for shifting much of the power 
currently enjoyed by local governments into a regional government.211  Tradi-
tional regionalism is rooted in skepticism of local government autonomy, partic-
ularly in the face of metropolitan fragmentation delineated by race and class.212  
Advocates of traditional forms of regionalism believe that the centralization of 
government powers throughout metropolitan regions is necessary to eliminate 
distributional inequalities between local governments caused by localism and de-
  
of Virginia public schools but also noting that more than fifty years after Brown, Black students in 
Virginia enroll in schools that are intensely racially and economically segregated). 
209. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 2034. 
210. See Parlow, supra note 81, at 64. 
211. See id. 
212. See H.V. Savitch & Ronald K. Vogel, Paths to New Regionalism, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 158, 
162 (2000) (describing traditional forms of regionalism as being based on the premise that the 
primary ills of local government stem from fragmentation). 
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centralization.213  A centralized regional government can operate more efficient-
ly, because it has the ability to pool tax resources and to regulate in a manner that 
takes into account the region as a whole, not just the individual localities within 
a region.214  Traditional forms of regionalism, however, have fallen out of favor.  
Scholars view traditional forms of regionalism as politically untenable because a 
core tenet of traditional regionalism is the enactment of centralized government 
and displacement of local government autonomy.215 
In contrast to traditional regionalism, new regionalism seeks to maintain ex-
isting local government structures while at the same time putting in place region-
al governance structures that recognize and address how localities within a 
metropolitan region are connected.216  New regionalism rejects the idea of having 
classical government structures replace local governments.217  Instead, proponents 
of new regionalism endorse limited metropolitan governance arrangements or 
various forms of voluntary intergovernmental cooperative agreements between 
local governments.218  New regionalism is viewed as a preferable approach to ad-
dressing inequalities within metropolitan areas because it recognizes the apparent 
  
213. See id. (noting that those in favor of consolidation or traditional regionalism believe that 
consolidation will “bring about social justice and equity between different jurisdictions by merging 
them into one grand public enterprise”). 
214. See id. (theorizing that centralized regional governments are “able to deal with segregation, income 
disparities, and the ever-growing problem of sprawl by pooling tax resources to build integrated 
housing, redistribute wealth, and regulate land use”).  Limited forms of traditional regionalism 
structures were enacted in the 1960s and 1970s as part of federal grant programs involving housing, 
transportation, and urban development.  Specifically, federal housing and transportation agencies 
required urban metropolitan areas to form regional governing bodies that had central planning 
authority and governance responsibilities as a condition for receiving federal housing and 
transportation grants.  See Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches 
to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 628, 641–42 (2010) (describing traditional 
forms of regional governments that were enacted as a requirement for receiving federal grants for 
housing through the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965). 
215. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 170 (1994) 
(arguing that regionalist proposals that completely displace suburban government are doomed and 
politically unfeasible).  Some forms of traditional regionalist governments still do exist, but their 
success in eliminating distributional inequalities and creating more efficient structures of 
government is debatable.  See, e.g., Savitch & Vogel, supra note 212, at 162 (describing traditional 
regionalism government structures in the form of central city consolidations that have taken place 
in Jacksonville, Indianapolis, and Nashville and questioning whether they have been successful in 
eliminating distributional inequalities and operating efficiently). 
216. See Parlow, supra note 81, at 64–65. 
217. Government entails formal institutions and elections, along with established decisionmaking 
processes and administrative structures.  Traditional regionalism favors formal government 
structures insofar as it seeks to displace local governments and to enact a centralized system of 
government.  See Savitch & Vogel, supra note 212, at 161–62. 
218. See id. at 161 (noting that governance structures rely on the idea that existing institutions can be 
harnessed in new ways and recognizes that localities can enter into interjurisdictional agreements to 
provide services to one another without establishing a classical government structure). 
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permanence of powerful local governments, while at the same time acknowledg-
ing the need for local governments to work together on some issues that affect the 
metropolitan region as a whole.219 
In a nutshell, new regionalism “offers a middle ground [in] the dispute over 
the allocation of state and local government power.” 220  It does so by recognizing 
the strengths and political necessity of local government authority, while at the 
same time acknowledging the need for localities to act in concert on some occa-
sions to increase efficiency and to eliminate regional inequalities.  As discussed in 
further detail below, new regionalism offers promise for increasing efficiency and 
eliminating inequalities in public education.221 
2. The Justifications That Support Enacting Regionalism  
in the General-Purpose Local Government Context Apply  
in the Education Context as Well 
Supporters of regionalism, particularly new regionalism proposals, advance 
four primary justifications for enacting regional governance structures: (1) in-
creasing efficiency, (2) recognition of the economic interdependence of localities 
within metropolitan regions, (3) increasing citizen participation, and (4) reducing 
interregional inequalities.222  These justifications, used in support of enacting new 
regionalism in the general local government context, apply with equal, if not 
greater, force in the context of public education. 
With respect to efficiency, in the general local government context, localism 
and the proliferation of independent autonomous localities arguably increases 
  
219. See Alexander, supra note 214, at 641–43 (describing new regionalism as a retreat from the 
unsuccessful attempts at displacement of local government powers favored by traditional 
regionalism and noting that new regionalism instead promotes interlocal cooperative agreements 
and limited-purpose metropolitan governments); Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra 
note 28, at  112 (arguing that new regionalism “notes the repeated failure of local government 
consolidation efforts in major metropolitan areas and stresses the permanence of existing multi-
purpose local governments”). 
220. Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 28, at 113. 
221. New regionalism literature contains several proposed policy approaches.  The “linked functions” 
proposal suggests that localities enter into interlocal service agreements for discrete services that 
potentially have interjurisdictional effects, such as solid-waste disposal or economic development.  
See Savitch & Vogel, supra note 212, at 163–64.  Similarly, the “complex networks” proposal 
suggests that localities should enter into a number of voluntary interlocal agreements in which 
“[n]umerous jurisdictions with overlapping services . . . [allow] citizens [to] seek out the most 
optimal arrangement for [their] particular circumstance.”  See id. at 164.  Finally, the “multitiered” 
proposal essentially advocates keeping local governments intact, but adding an additional 
metropolitan or regional tier of government to provide public services that have interjurisdictional 
effects or require redistribution to ensure regional equity.  See id. at 162–63.   
222. See Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 28, at 113. 
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public infrastructure costs and creates inefficiencies.223  Scholars increasingly see 
regionalism, by virtue of increasing the governance base while at the same time 
keeping the size of the base small enough to be manageable, as a way to increase 
the efficiency in the provision of public goods.224  In the education context, in-
creasing the territorial base of governance through some forms of regional gov-
ernance structures could streamline operational expenses for neighboring school 
districts.225  It could also result in critical information sharing between districts 
thereby triggering an efficient mechanism to “distribute some of the community’s 
intangible educational resources,” such as effective teaching techniques and ways 
to innovate curricula.226 
In terms of appropriately recognizing the interdependent nature of ju-
risdictions within metropolitan areas,227 experts view economic growth within 
metropolitan regions as contingent on the health of the individual cities and 
suburbs within the region.228  As such, it is in the self-interest of poorer cities 
and more affluent suburbs to ensure that each locality is functioning well.229  
This justification has particular force with respect to disparities in education.  
Education is a key driver of economic health and growth.230  Recent research 
shows that concentrated poverty and low quality public education limits eco-
nomic mobility within metropolitan regions and has a harmful impact on the 
  
223. See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 129, at 8 (suggesting that existing local 
governance systems exacerbate urban sprawl by “creat[ing] a demand for expensive new 
infrastructure—highways and streets, sewage treatment facilities, fire stations, schools—in growing 
communities on the urban fringe”). 
224. See FOSTER, supra note 128, at 4 (noting that by virtue of their scale, regions have the potential to 
address sprawl and equity issues wrought by metropolitan fragmentation); Reynolds, supra note 30, 
at 491 (noting that even staunch supporters of localism admit that regionalist governance structures 
would enlarge the territorial base, thereby distributing infrastructure costs more efficiently). 
225. See, e.g., Kiel, supra note 6, at 161 (describing how the involuntary merger of the Memphis City 
Schools district and the Shelby County Schools district provided an opportunity for costs savings 
via reducing expenses incurred by both districts and allowed for the pursuit of operational 
efficiencies). 
226. See id. 
227. Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 129, at 12 (documenting an increasing interest in 
regionalism due to a belief that regionalist governance structures are a necessity because of the new 
global economy that situates the region as the premier unit of economic competition); Reynolds, 
Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra note 28, at 113. 
228. See Griffith, supra note 34, at 512–13; Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, supra 
note 30, at 491–92 (documenting the interdependence argument in support of regionalism, which 
finds that suburban economic health is codependent on a strong central city and, for reasons 
therefore rooted in self-interest, affluent segments of metropolitan areas should support regional 
redistribution efforts). 
229. See Griffith, supra note 34, at 512–13. 
230. See CARNEVALE ET AL., supra note 131. 
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economic vitality of metropolitan regions as a whole.231  To the extent that re-
gional governance structures can more evenly allocate public education resources 
to ensure that more students within a metropolitan region have access to high-
quality education, enacting regional governance structures in education could 
help to buttress the economic vitality of metropolitan regions. 
Further, just as proponents of localism suggest that localism enhances dem-
ocratic values, proponents of regionalism also make this claim.232  Proponents of 
regionalism suggest that because localities within metropolitan areas are inti-
mately connected, but locally bounded, in terms of their authority, individuals do 
not have a say in addressing critical issues that cross boundary lines such as sprawl 
and economic development.233  Arguably, regionalism would increase democratic 
participation by “widening the scale of participation to include all of those affect-
ed by local actions.”234  In the education context, research has shown that while 
participation in school governance is low, participation increases when school 
governance structures are put in place that enable them to actually make positive 
changes in their children’s schools.235  Thus, the enactment of regional governing 
bodies that could ensure a more equitable distribution of public education re-
sources has the potential to increase citizen participation.236 
Finally, one of the foremost justifications for enacting regionalism is to 
eliminate inequalities between neighboring metropolitan jurisdictions.  Under 
this rationale, proponents of regionalism advise that localist governance struc-
tures are in many ways rooted in racism and intentionally perpetuate race- and 
class-based disparities.237  From this perspective, localist governance structures 
  
231. See RAJ CHETTY ET AL., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: EVIDENCE 
FROM SPATIAL VARIATION ACROSS THE U.S. (2013), available at http://obs.rc.fas.harvard. 
edu/chetty/tax_expenditure_soi_whitepaper.pdf (documenting the impact of spatial variation in 
taxes and income across metropolitan regions on economic mobility and the health of metropolitan 
regions). 
232. See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 129, at 20–22. 
233. See id. at 21 (“Local issues like sprawl, the adequacy of local tax bases to local service needs, and 
economic development may not be capable of successful resolution at the local level.  The 
individual may have a larger role in the formulation of local policies, but in the metropolitan context 
purely local decisions may be powerless to solve many critical problems.”). 
234. Id. at 21–22. 
235. See NOGUERA, supra note 190, at 98 (citing the creation of local site councils in Chicago 
comprised of parents and community representatives who had the authority to hire school 
principals, approve school budgets and receive reports on academic plans, as a model for increasing  
parental participation in Chicago schools). 
236. See infra Part IV. 
237. See, e.g., Troutt, supra note 132, at 1171 (arguing that “the re-entrenchment of racial and economic 
segregation was facilitated by this country's legal and ideological commitment to localism” and 
advocating for regionalism in order to restore racial and economic justice); Bob Wing, What we 
Need to Do About The ‘Burbs, COLORLINES (Sept. 15, 1999, 12:00 PM), http://colorlines.com/ 
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create social and economic disparities between localities by, among other things, 
allowing localities to enact exclusionary zoning policies, which results in localities 
having disparate financial bases.238  The social costs of poverty are therefore borne 
exclusively by poorer, usually central-city or inner-ring suburbs while more afflu-
ent, typically suburban, localities enjoy the benefits of being within the metro-
politan region without absorbing any of the social costs.239  For these reasons, 
some see regionalism as necessary to allocate more fairly the costs of metropolitan 
poverty and to lessen the current stark fiscal and social inequalities that exist be-
tween neighboring localities.240 
In the education context, the reduction of regional inequalities offers the 
most attractive rationale for enacting regionalist governance strictures in public 
education.  In particular, imposing regionalist structures may discourage the 
hoarding of quality educational resources and instead facilitate the process of 
metropolitan residents recognizing the ways in which the health of urban schools 
is relevant to suburban schools and the overall wellbeing of the metropolitan re-
gion as a whole.241  To the extent that regionalist structures can increase the per-
meability of school district boundary lines and allow for a more equitable sharing 
of resources (including money) between school districts, such structures also offer 
hope for reducing the gross fiscal and academic achievement disparities between 
neighboring school districts.242   
  
archives/1999/09/what_we_need_to_do_about_the_burbs.html (“Today, metropolitan regions are 
divided racially and spatially into largely white and affluent suburbs and largely non-white and poor 
urban centers.  These dynamics are at the heart of racial inequality today.  If this inequality is to be 
effectively fought, suburban sprawl and political fragmentation must be combated by movements 
for regional and metropolitan equity.”). 
238. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Towards a Legal Framework for Regional Redistribution of Poverty-
Related Expenses, 47 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 15–22 (1995) (describing how 
exclusionary zoning policies create fiscal disparities between localities within the city, typically 
having lower tax revenue available to it and higher spending needs in the form of social support 
and infrastructure that is used by city and suburban residents). 
239. See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 1987 
(describing the benefits enjoyed by the “favored quarter” without having to absorb their fair share of 
the costs of poverty within the metropolitan area); Poindexter, supra note 238, at 15 (“Exclusionary 
zoning allows municipalities to take a ‘free ride’ on the payment of poverty-related expenditures at 
the expense of other communities in the region.”). 
240. See Poindexter, supra note 238, at 24–27 (advocating for direct or indirect taxation on suburban 
residents in the name of regional equity). 
241. See, e.g., Susan Heaton, ‘Learning Community’ Nebraska Program Brings Diversity to Some Highly 
Segregated Public Schools, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/01/28/learning-community-nebras_n_2568475.html (describing the benefits of 
the interdistrict collaboration wrought by the Nebraska learning plan). 
242. See infra Part IV.C. 
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C. Obstacles to Regionalism in Public Education 
“[A]lmost no one favors metropolitan area government ex-
cept a few political scientists and intellectuals.”243 
While the justifications for enacting regionalism are plentiful, resistance to 
regionalism is strong.  The primary objection to regionalism is a philosophical 
one: America has long been committed to decentralized government because of 
its purported benefits of enhancing democracy and promoting efficiency.244  
This is particularly true with respect to objections to regionalism in public edu-
cation.  Many routinely reject calls for regionalism as infusing an unnecessary 
level of government and overriding the will of the people to locate themselves for 
governance purposes as they see fit.245  Others philosophically reject regionalist 
proposals because of fears that centralization of government powers will result in 
bureaucracy, particularly a loss of participatory and responsive democratic gov-
ernance structures that localism enables.246 
In addition to philosophical resistance to regionalism, there is also signifi-
cant political resistance to regionalism.  Undoubtedly, the American philosophi-
cal commitment to localism partially motivates the political resistance to 
regionalism.  Yet much of the political resistance to regionalism is rooted in 
simple self-interest.247  Residents who live in “favored quarters” benefit from in-
sulating themselves from the social costs attached to living in a metropolitan re-
  
243. DOWNS, supra note 215, at 170. 
244. See supra Part II.B. 
245. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 31, 32–33 (2000) 
[hereinafter Frug, Against Centralization] (decrying calls for centralization, in the form of 
regional levels of government, as implying a level of coercion and usurpation of citizen choice 
making it politically unpopular and impracticable); Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of 
Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 426 (2001) (“Any proposed limiting principle on local power 
must differentiate between local decisions to exclude and local choices to instantiate a way of 
life, which are often one and the same.”). 
246. See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1173, 1184 (1996) (taking a position against centralization in the form of certain proposals 
for regionalism, reasoning that “we will lose the opportunities for participatory, or at least 
responsive, democratic government, effective place based political initiatives, and civic interaction 
and identification with the public sphere[,] [m]eanwhile government will become more distant, 
more bureaucratic, and less responsive”); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal 
Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 208 (2001) (“[I]t is by no means clear that centralization 
translates into a greater likelihood that those affected will receive representation.”). 
247. See, e.g., Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 129, at 27 (“[T]he resistance to regionalism 
in the political process is largely a matter of the self-interest of those who benefit from the status 
quo, such as local elected officials, land developers, corporations that are the subjects of interlocal 
bidding, and the businesses and residents located in the high-tax base localities of the metropolitan 
area.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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gion, while at the same time benefiting from their geographic positioning within 
a metropolitan region.248  As a result, they fervently resist regionalist governance 
proposals in order to prevent a redistribution of resources and to protect the sta-
tus quo that favors them.249  Similarly, people who live in the “non-favored quar-
ter” also reject regionalism, particularly minority communities, because of a 
desire to maintain control over their own communities and fears that regional-
ism will result in their being politically usurped by people who live in more afflu-
ent localities.250  
In attempting to enact regionalism in public education, the greatest obsta-
cles are undoubtedly the philosophical commitment to localism and the political 
resistance to regionalism.  One way to cultivate the political will required is to 
demonstrate to suburban residents both the benefits of moving toward regionalist 
education structures and the perils of not doing so.  In terms of the benefits, re-
search suggests that the overall economic health of metropolitan areas suffers 
when the workforce within the area is poorly educated.  In particular, crime in-
creases as does the costs of social welfare programs when large blocks of students 
are inadequately educated.251  Enacting regionalist governance structures in pub-
  
248. See id. at 27; Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter, supra note 26, at 
2030–31 (“[I]n most metropolitan regions the collective well-being of the region is not being 
pursued, primarily because of the aggregate spillover effects of local power being exercised by scores 
of autonomous localities, each without consideration of the impact of local decisions on the entire 
region.”). 
249. See Poindexter, supra note 238, at 23–24 (arguing that the favored quarter embraces localism 
because it allows them to segregate themselves into homogenous communities without having to 
pay for their fair share of the resources needed for regional infrastructure and social welfare 
programs).  In addition to self-interest, resistance to regionalism, to the extent it redistributes 
resources to non-whites, may be rejected not just for reasons of self-interest but also for reasons 
related to racial bias.  See e.g., David O. Sears and P.J. Henry, Over Thirty Years Later: A 
Contemporary Look at Symbolic Racism, in MARK ZANNA, ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 37, 95–150 (2005) (noting that some research indicates that white self-
interest as “operationalized by racial threats to whites personal lives is rarely a significant factor in 
white opposition to racial policies”). 
250. See Cashin, Middle Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration, supra note 79, at 734 (“African-
American economic or fiscal self-interest lies with integration but for many Black suburbanites the 
psychic benefits of ‘being with one's own’ may be worth the costs of segregation.”); Frug, Against 
Centralization, supra note 245, at 33 (“Many African-American mayors of declining central cities 
have become equally enamored of local power, preferring to run their cities in their own way rather 
than submit to centralized control.”). 
251. See HENRY M. LEVIN, CAMPAIGN FOR EDUC. EQUITY, THE SOCIAL COST OF INADEQUATE 
EDUCATION 6, 16–19 (2005) (describing the threat of inadequately educating children, as these 
children are more likely to be arrested, become pregnant, use drugs, experience violence, and 
require public assistance, which diminishes the competitiveness of America’s current and future 
workforce).  In addition, inadequately educating children is a civic threat because our children’s 
overall enfranchisement—their personal stake in society—so clearly mirrors their educational 
levels.  Id.  
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lic education would allow more citizens to become better educated thereby in-
creasing the economic vitality of metropolitan regions as a whole and reducing 
crime and other social costs associated with an inadequate education. 
Further, the problems associated with racial and economic segregation in 
central city urban schools are steadily arising in suburbs as well.252  This is the case 
because of demographic shifts in school age population, as more minority parents 
and students are residing in suburbs, and an economic recession that has resulted 
in a loss of jobs and tax base for once privileged suburban areas.253  Thus, given 
that the same problems that plague predominately minority and poor urban dis-
tricts are now migrating to the suburbs, it would behoove suburban residents to 
become invested in solutions that improve the lot of everyone rather than utiliz-
ing an exit strategy.254  Indeed, research has shown that communities that em-
brace solutions that seek to effectively integrate an influx of minority and poor 
students into an existing system rather than allowing white flight are able to 
maintain stability and cultivate student success.255 
With respect to the perils, a fair number of urban districts are experiencing 
extreme distress.  Indeed, many urban school districts across the country are in 
such fiscal distress that they are making unprecedented cuts to personnel and 
programming.256  In extreme cases, states are taking over schools257 or school dis-
tricts are closing schools altogether.258  Such actions by urban school districts have 
  
252. See generally Frankenberg & Orfield, supra note 62, at 1. 
253. Id. at 1–5, 16–17. 
254. Id. (noting that at some point, given the demographic shifts, exits to other localities will no longer 
be a viable option for middle-class white parents). 
255. See, e.g., HEATHER SCHWARTZ, CENTURY FOUNDATION, HOUSING POLICY IS SCHOOL 
POLICY: ECONOMICALLY INTEGRATIVE HOUSING PROMOTES ACADEMIC SUCCESS IN 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND (2010), available at http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-
Schwartz.pdf (describing the efforts in Montgomery County, Maryland to successfully integrate an 
increasing number of low-income and minority students into the predominately white and affluent 
school system through inclusionary zoning programs and policies aimed at fostering racial and 
economic integration); see also Frankenberg & Orfield, supra note 62, at 10 (“[S]chools and 
neighborhoods . . . could be strengthened and other diverse areas stabilized if meaningful regional 
policies designed to support such areas were put in place.”). 
256. See Kristi L. Bowman, Before School Districts Go Broke: A Proposal for Federal Reform, 79 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 895, 905–906 (2010) (noting that two-thirds of school districts laid-off teachers and staff for 
the 2009–2010 school year and that districts were implementing cost saving measures such as 
reducing the length of the school day, week or year; cutting gifted education programs and 
charging students to ride the bus to school).   
257. See, e.g., Kristi L. Bowman, State Takeovers of School Districts and Related Litigation, 45 URB. LAW. 
1, 8–11 (2013) (noting that three school districts in Michigan were subject to take over by the state 
and that the takeover was the result of the districts being in a state of fiscal crisis). 
258. See, e.g., PA. CLEARINGHOUSE FOR EDUC. RESEARCH, ISSUE BRIEF: SCHOOL CLOSINGS 
POLICY (2013), available at http://www.researchforaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ 
RFA-PACER-School-Closing-Policy-Brief-March-2013.pdf; Valerie Strauss, How Closing 
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negative implications for the region as a whole.  For example, in Memphis, Ten-
nessee, the public schools went into such a state of financial distress that the 
Memphis city school board voted to voluntarily surrender their charter to the 
state.259  As a result, the Memphis City Schools and the Shelby County Schools 
dissolved into one school district,260 effectively creating a regional school dis-
trict.261  Further, state takeovers or increased state roles in schools have social and 
financial costs that are ultimately borne by all state taxpayers.262  Regionalism ad-
vocates can use these perilous examples to demonstrate to suburban residents why 
adopting regionalism is in their best interest.263  Simply put, regionalism, if enact-
ed properly, will allow them to maintain some of the strengths of local control of 
education while at the same time having a voice in helping to improve public ed-
ucation for the region as a whole.264  Placing a strong emphasis on the aforemen-
tioned benefits of enacting regionalism in public education and the perils of not 
doing so is one suggestion for generating the political will necessary to enact re-
gionalism in public education.   
  
Schools Hurts Neighborhoods, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2013/03/06/how-closing-schools-hurts-neighborhoods; Bowman 
Before School Districts Go Broke, supra, note 256, at 906.   
259. See Daniel Kiel, A Memphis Dilemma: A Half-Century of Public Education Reform in Memphis and 
Shelby County From Desegregation to Consolidation, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 787, 824–33 (2011). 
260. Id. 
261. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Making a Regional District: Memphis City Schools Dissolves Into Its 
Suburbs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 47 (2012) (arguing that the Memphis City Schools 
forced consolidation into Shelby County Schools amounted to a forced regionalization of the 
Memphis and Shelby school districts). 
262. See Emily Richmond, What Would Happen If the State Took Over Your District?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 
1, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/what-would-happen-
if-the-state-took-over-your-school-district/274527 (describing the social and fiscal consequences 
of the increasing number of state takeovers of failing urban schools and increased state involvement 
in cities such as Cleveland, Detroit, and Camden). 
263. In addition to education specific examples of the dangers of failing to embrace some forms of regionalism, 
examples also exist in the noneducation context.  For example, in January of 2014, the Atlanta 
metropolitan region experienced an extreme snowstorm that paralyzed the entire region and left motorists 
stranded for hours on frozen highways.  See Kim Severson, Questions Fly in the Storm that Stopped Atlanta,  
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/us/mayor-unapologetic-in-eye-of-
storm-that-brought-atlanta-to-a-halt.html?_ r=0.  Commentators pointed to the balkanization of 
local governments in the Atlanta Metropolitan region and the failure to embrace regionalism as a 
significant cause of the paralysis caused by the snowstorm.  See e.g., Rebecca Burns, The Day We 
Lost Atlanta, How 2 Lousy Inches of Snow Paralyzed a Metropolitan Area of 6 Million, POLITICO 
MAGAZINE, Jan. 29, 2014 (noting that during the snow storm was there was little coordination 
“because ‘Atlanta’ is comprised of dozens of municipalities connected by state and federal highway 
systems” and concluding that if Atlanta wants to get serious about public safety “it will need to start 
practicing regionalism instead of paying lip service to it).   
264. See supra Part IV. 
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Lastly, enacting regionalism in public education also faces the practical ob-
stacle of existing state and local government law structures.  Regional governance 
frameworks are not part of most state constitutions.265  As a result, the creation of 
regional governance frameworks would require complex reworking and integra-
tion of regional frameworks into existing state legal schemes.266  In the education 
context, unlike general-purpose local governments, school districts are true crea-
tures of the state and are heavily regulated by the state.  For example, states have 
the authority to define school district boundaries,267 are responsible for financially 
supporting school districts,268 and have the ability to set educational policy such as 
curriculum standards and graduation requirements.269  Further, consistent with a 
state’s high level of regulation of school districts, states generally do not afford 
school districts the broad discretion of home rule authority270 that is afforded to 
general-purpose local governments.271  Because states have plenary power over 
school districts,272 as a matter of law, it is possible for states to enact regionalist 
frameworks to govern the dissemination of public education. 
  
265. See Griffith, supra note 34, at 521–23 (describing the challenges that exist to integrating regional 
frameworks because of existing state constitutions and legal regimes, which for the most part do 
not contemplate regional government).  But see OR. CONST. (amended to afford Portland Metro 
regional government home rule charter); CARL ABBOTT & MARY POST ABBOTT, ABBOTT: A 
HISTORY OF METRO, MAY 1991 (2010), available at http://library.oregonmetro.gov/ 
files//abbott-a_history_of_metro_may_1991.pdf. 
266. See Griffith, supra note 34, at 521 (“Because lawmakers have not meshed metropolitan 
governments into state constitutional and legal frameworks, an attempt to fit them into the existing 
governmental setup faces innumerable hurdles.”); Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, supra 
note 28, at 119–21 (describing the existing state enabling authority that would allow for 
intermunicipal agreements regarding the provision of public services). 
267. See, e.g., Sherwood Sch. Dist. 88J v. Wash Cnty. Educ. Serv. Dist., 6 P.3d 518, 526 (Or. Ct. App. 
2000) (determining that a necessary incident of the legislature’s authority to establish a uniform and 
general system of common schools is the authority to establish or change the boundaries of school 
districts). 
268. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1249, 1256 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the state of California 
“has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Constitution” 
and that the California state legislature was required to provide financially distressed school districts 
with funds so that it would not be forced to close six weeks before the end of the school year). 
269. See, e.g., Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1143, 1158 (Mass. 2005) (finding that 
state legislation, which set curriculum and established minimum standards for receiving a high 
school diploma, was constitutional under the Massachusetts constitution education clause). 
270. Home rule authority refers to a broad delegation of authority by the state, through state statutory 
provisions or state constitution provisions, to local governments over matters of local concern.  See 
RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 331–332 (7th ed. 2009). 
271. See Briffault, The Local School District, supra note 18, at 34; Saiger,  The Last Wave, supra note 24, at 
866 (noting that school districts have no parallel constitutional protections such as the home rule 
protections afforded to general-purpose local governments). 
272. See supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying notes. 
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D. Existing Regionalist Frameworks in Public Education: Successes  
and Challenges 
The ideological preference for localism in public education is so deeply en-
trenched that there are few examples of regionalism in American public educa-
tion.  In elementary and secondary public education, the closest parallels to re-
regionalism are voluntary choice-based interdistrict desegregation plans.273  
Eight U.S. metropolitan areas have enacted such plans: Minneapolis, Minne-
sota;274 Palo Alto, California;275 Hartford, Connecticut;276 St. Louis, Mis-
souri;277 Rochester, New York;278 Boston, Massachusetts;279 Milwaukee, 
  
273. For a detailed overview of some of the more comprehensive voluntary choice-based interdistrict 
desegregation plans that exist, see AMY STUART WELLS ET AL., CHARLES HAMILTON 
HOUSTON INST. FOR RACE & JUSTICE, HARVARD LAW SCH., BOUNDARY CROSSING FOR 
DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND ACHIEVEMENT: INTER-DISTRICT SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (2009). 
274. Minneapolis has three large-scale multidistrict collaborations: the West Metro Education 
Program, the East Metro Integration District, and the Northwest Suburban Integration School 
District.  Minnesota state law authorizes the collaborations under a joint powers agreement.  The 
collaborations expanded after the settlement of a lawsuit brought by the Minnesota branch of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  The NAACP alleged 
that the Minneapolis public schools were segregated by race and class, and the students were not 
receiving a similar education to students in neighboring districts that had fewer minorities and low-
income students.  See Myron Orfield, Regional Strategies for Integration of Schools and Housing Post-
Parents Involved, 29 LAW & INEQ. 149, 168 (2011). 
275. See Tinsley Voluntary Transfer Program, SAN MATEO CNTY. OFFICE OF EDUC.,  http://www. 
smcoe.k12.ca.us/InstructionalServicesDivisionISD/ess/Pages/tinsley.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 
2013) (detailing the Tinsley Voluntary Transfer Program that lawyers crafted as part of the 1986 
settlement of a desegregation lawsuit and permits up to one-thousand students of color from East 
Palo Alto’s Ravenswood school district to enroll in seven nearby districts: Palo Alto, Menlo Park, 
Portola Valley, Las Lomitas, Woodside, San Carlos, and Belmont-Redwood Shores). 
276. In response to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996), 
in which the Connecticut Supreme Court found that poor and minority public school students had 
been denied equal educational opportunities, the state created the Hartford Open Choice program 
that allows students to voluntarily transfer between the Hartford public schools and neighboring 
suburban schools.  The program also established an interdistrict magnet school program, which 
established fifty magnet schools that are open to students from districts throughout the 
metropolitan region.  See Robert Bifulco et al., Can Interdistrict Choice Boost Student Achievement?: 
The Case of Connecticut’s Interdistrict Magnet School Program, EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 323 (2009); Casey Cobb et al., Legally Viable Desegregation Strategies: The Case of 
Connecticut, in INTEGRATING SCHOOLS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 131 (Erica Frankenberg & 
Elizabeth DeBray eds., 2011) (analyzing Connecticut interdistrict and open choice plans). 
277. The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in 1980 that the St. Louis Public School Board of Education and 
the State of Missouri were responsible for maintaining a segregated school system.  In 1981, the 
Court of Appeals directed that a voluntary interdistrict plan be worked out between the city and the 
county schools.  See Liddell v. Bd. of Educ., 693 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1981).  There are sixteen 
participating school districts.  A Voluntary Inter-district Coordinating Council, which oversaw 
implementation of the 1983 settlement agreement, became a nonprofit corporation in 1999, and 
was renamed the Voluntary Inter-district Choice Corporation (VICC).  Each of the sixteen 
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Wisconsin;280 and Omaha, Nebraska.281  The central goal of all of these pro-
grams is desegregation—namely to achieve greater levels of racial integration 
between school districts in light of the geographic limits placed on interdistrict 
desegregation remedies by the Court in Milliken.282  Many of the programs 
consist of student transfers from city school districts to suburban school dis-
tricts.283  Others include interdistrict magnet schools that draw students from 
both city and suburban school districts.284  All of the programs are voluntary; 
students must choose to enroll and cannot be compelled to do so.285 
These regionalist-like interdistrict desegregation programs have achieved 
moderate success, most notably in reducing racial segregation between school 
districts and offering students access to high-performing suburban schools that 
they otherwise would not be able to attend.286  Further, they have also arguably 
succeeded in helping to close the academic achievement gap between minority 
and nonminority students enrolled in the programs, improved racial attitudes 
among students and parents within the collaborating districts, particularly white 
parents, and increased the likelihood that minority students would go on to ob-
tain education beyond high school.287 
  
participating districts has a vote in VICC business in proportion to the number of voluntary 
transfer students it serves.  Only two of these sixteen districts have a voting share greater than 10 
percent.  See Historical Background, VOLUNTARY INTERDISTRICT CHOICE CORP., http://www. 
choicecorp.org/HistBack.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
278. Rochester has an urban-suburban interdistrict transfer plan (USITP).  The USITP developed 
because of a call in 1963 by New York’s Education Commissioner for districts to consider how to 
reduce racial imbalances and improve educational opportunities for disadvantaged students.  See 
KARA S. FINNEGAN & TRICIA J. STEWART, NAT’L CTR. ON SCH. CHOICE, VANDERBILT 
UNIV., INTERDISTRICT CHOICE AS A POLICY SOLUTION: EXAMINING ROCHESTER’S 
URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDISTRICT TRANSFER PROGRAM (USITP) (2009). 
279. Boston is part of a voluntary interdistrict desegregation program called the Metropolitan Council 
for Educational Opportunity (METCO).  METCO is funded through a grant from the state of 
Massachusetts.  METCO is operated by the Massachusetts Department of Education.  It allows 
non-white students from racially imbalanced schools in Boston and Springfield to transfer into 
districts in nearby suburban districts.  See generally METCO Program, MASSACHUSETTS 
DEPARTMENT OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION,  http://www.doe.mass. 
edu/metco/faq.html?section=all (last updated Dec. 19, 2013).   
280. See Milwaukee Neighborhood Schools Initiative, WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU (Dec. 
1999), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/budbriefs/99bb18.pdf. 
281. See Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational Policy, supra note 24 (describing the 
Omaha, Nebraska Learning Community interdistrict desegregation plan). 
282. See supra Part II. 
283. WELLS ET AL., supra note 273. 
284. Id. at 24. 
285. Id. at 3. 
286. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 274, at 169 (documenting the successes of the Minneapolis programs). 
287. See WELLS ET AL., supra note 273, at 4–8. 
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Nevertheless, despite their successes, as other scholars have noted, they also 
have a number of practical challenges that limit their overall effectiveness.  First, 
their scope is often limited.288  They serve a small number of students relative to 
the number of students in the metropolitan areas in which they operate.289  These 
programs also lack governing bodies with proportionate representation and with 
the authority to make policy decisions beyond the desegregation goal of the dis-
tricts.290  For example, the desegregation programs in Hartford, Connecticut, and 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, have regional governing bodies that consist of one rep-
resentative from the participating school districts without regard for the size of 
various districts that make up the regionalist governing bodies.291  The lack of 
proportional representation makes it likely that these regionalist governing bodies 
may not adequately address the interests of the larger districts, which are typically 
poor and minority.292 
Moreover, the interdistrict plans all lack comprehensive and effective fund-
ing schemes to address fiscal disparities between participating districts.293  In-
stead, the interdistrict plans for the most part rely on voluntary funding or state 
per-pupil allotments that do not adequately address the fiscal disparities between 
the participating districts.294  Significantly, with the exception of an interdistrict 
  
288. See James E. Ryan & Micheal Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 
2070–72 (2002) (surveying the voluntary interdistrict desegregation programs in Massachusetts, 
Missouri, and Connecticut, and positing that the programs are intentionally limited in scope in 
order to prevent large numbers of urban students from transferring into the suburban districts). 
289. See Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 16 (noting that only 500 students in 
Rochester utilized the interdistrict desegregation plan, 5800 in St. Louis, and 7000 in Hartford); 
Cobb et al., supra note 276, at 134 (examining the Connecticut interdistrict magnet program and 
finding that interdistrict magnet schools provide access to less isolated learning environments for 
only a small number of students of color). 
290. See Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 20 (acknowledging that the voluntary 
interdistrict plans are the closest parallel to regionalism in public education, but also noting that 
most “have no authority beyond the inter-district transfer programs: they don’t address other 
fragmentation-related inequities, such as the redistribution of revenue to member districts”). 
291. See id.  
292. See id.  
293. See Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Choosing Diversity: School Choice and Racial 
Integration in the Age of Obama, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 219, 238 (2010) (describing the funding 
deficiencies of most of the interdistrict desegregation plans and noting that most have faced 
difficulties in funding the administrative and transportation costs of the programs). 
294. For example, the Hartford, Connecticut, Capital Region Education Council (CREC), a regional 
body that coordinates Hartford’s magnet schools, is funded by voluntary funding in the form of 
state and federal grants and private funds.  In addition, local school districts become members of 
CREC with an annual fee of twenty cents per pupil.  See About CREC, CAPITAL REGION EDUC. 
COUNCIL, http://www.crec.org/crec/about/index.php (last visited Nov. 1, 2013); see also Holme & 
Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 20 (noting that almost all of the interdistrict 
desegregation plans lack revenue sharing and redistribution of revenue between participating school 
districts). 
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plan in Omaha, Nebraska, discussed in further detail below, none of the 
interdistrict plans requires the redistribution of tax revenue to poorer school dis-
tricts.295  Finally, all of the interdistrict programs are largely voluntary.296  This is 
the case primarily because the political will to enact regionalism in public educa-
tion is weak at best.  Thus, the few regionalist public governance structures that 
exist in public education are small in scope and voluntary, such that they do not 
challenge the dominant localist refrain in public education.  Yet the successes of 
the interdistrict plans should not be minimized or overlooked and instead suggest 
that an expansion of regionalism in public education warrants at least serious con-
sideration. 
IV. EQUITABLE FEDERATED REGIONALISM IN PUBLIC EDUCATION:  
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The interdistrict school desegregation plans described in Part III provide a 
blueprint of the possibilities for enacting regionalist governance structures in 
public education.  But they also provide a window into the challenges or limita-
tions that exist in enacting regionalism in public education.  This Part examines 
what a more expansive system of regionalism in public education might look like.  
Using the successes and pitfalls of the interdistrict desegregation plans as a guide, 
this Part proposes a theoretical framework that could be followed to effectively 
enact regionalism in public education.  The theoretical framework proposed by 
this Article is entitled Equitable Federated Regionalism.  It borrows from princi-
ples of equitable regionalism and federated regionalism, both described in this 
Part.  The framework responds to the equity and efficiency issues that plague ur-
ban metropolitan areas and would be most useful when applied to the urban met-
ropolitan context. 
A. Equitable Regionalism 
Equitable regionalism is a form of new regionalism that responds to the ex-
clusionary aspects of localism and decentralized governance structures—namely 
  
295. See Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 20, 22 (describing a tax base sharing 
scheme in the Nebraska interdistrict desegregation plan); see also infra Part IV.C (describing in 
additional detail the Nebraska desegregation plan and tax base sharing scheme). 
296. See Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 20; Ryan & Heise, supra note 288, 
at 2046. 
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concentrated poverty and racial segregation.297  Proponents of equitable regional-
ism suggest that the resistance to regionalism is a reflection of structural racism.298  
In particular, they suggest that the preference for localism is rooted in “preserving 
racial segregation and perpetuating its corresponding economic advantages and 
disadvantages that fall mainly, but not exclusively, along racial lines.”299  Thus, lo-
calities will not voluntarily cooperate in addressing certain issues, even when to 
do so would be in the best interest of the locality and the metropolitan region as 
a whole.300 
For example, consider issues with distinct equity implications such as af-
fordable housing, public housing, and public education.  Given the impact that 
they have on metropolitan regions as whole, these issues should be amenable to 
regional cooperation but are not due to the strong preference for localism.301  No-
tably, goods with equity implications also implicate private associational prefer-
ences.  Thus, the strong ideological commitment to localism may not truly reflect 
a desire for small local government and decentralization, but might instead be a 
reflection of a strong resistance to racial and economic integration.302  Indeed, as 
suggested by Gregory Weiher’s boundary recruitment theory, to the extent that 
boundary lines have social meaning and help people realize particular racialized 
preferences, regionalism disrupts those preferences.303  People are therefore un-
likely to voluntarily agree to engage in regionalism, particularly in areas such as 
housing and education, where regionalism may result in racial and economic in-
tegration. 
Thus, rather than relying on organic voluntary cooperation, equitable re-
gionalism proposes that states enact legislation to facilitate cooperation between 
localities on issues that are unlikely to otherwise net voluntary cooperation be-
  
297. See Troutt, supra note 132, at 1172; Ronald Hayduk, Race and Suburban Sprawl: Regionalism and 
Structural Racism, in SUBURBAN SPRAWL, THEORY SPRAWL: CULTURE, THEORY AND 
POLITICS (Matthew J. Lindstrom & Hugh Bartling, eds. 2003).   
298. See Troutt, supra note 102, at 338. 
299. Id. at 325; see also Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 129, at 27 (describing the 
preference for localism and ardent resistance to regionalism in most metropolitan areas as a 
function of self-interests, namely preserving existing political control over resources and shielding 
wealthier localities from having to share responsibility in providing for the needs of the 
socioeconomically disadvantaged in poorer localities). 
300. Troutt, supra note 102, at 337 (arguing that the “legal and political deference to [localism], permits 
self-interested, irrational, and inefficient preferences to flourish at the expense of regions, cities, and 
impoverished minority communities within them”). 
301. See Troutt, supra note 132, at 1172 (citing affordable and public housing, revenue sharing, and 
density control as examples of issues that should be susceptible to regional cooperation but are not 
due to localist opposition). 
302. Id. 
303. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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tween localities.304  Equitable regionalists envision such state legislation taking 
many forms including compelling interlocal cooperation or merely incentivizing 
cooperation.305  The key is the involvement of the state in facilitating cooperation 
between localities rather than leaving it to localities themselves to come together 
to address issues that impact the region as a whole. 
Public education is undoubtedly an area in which there are immense equity 
concerns about the way we disseminate it throughout metropolitan regions, but 
also there is immense opposition to changing the localist governance structures 
inherent in public education.306  Scholars and policymakers with experience in 
both voluntary and involuntary coordination between school districts, particularly 
urban and suburban districts, note that state leadership is a critical component to 
the success of any attempt to enact regionalism in public education.307  Given the 
weaknesses inherent in voluntary attempts at enacting regionalism in public edu-
cation, in some instances, states should enact legislation mandating regionalism 
or cooperation between neighboring school districts.  The Nebraska Learning 
Community Legislation described in Part IV, provides a good example of the 
type of state legislation mandating regional cooperation between school districts 
that has been successful. 
While mandatory legislation undoubtedly faces numerous political obstacles 
that may in some instances prove insurmountable, an alternative would be for 
states to enact legislation that includes incentives for regional coordination be-
tween school districts to essentially coerce cooperation between school dis-
tricts.308  For example, several states have adopted financial incentive programs to 
  
304. Troutt, supra note 132, at 1173 (“[E]quitable regionalism is a principle of local government law 
reform by which states enact legislation to compel interlocal cooperation where equity, and often 
efficiency, demand it.”). 
305. Id. at 1173 (“The principle may take many forms, from top-down to bottom-up, voluntary and 
compulsory, population cut-offs—or locality size—for participation requirements, commission-
driven, and/or legislative.”). 
306. See supra Part II.C. 
307. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 191, at 123–24 (suggesting that instead of purely localist systems of 
public education distribution, the state should be responsible for maintaining equity in public 
education with assistance from regional organizations); Kiel, supra note 6, at 167–70 (describing 
the merger of the urban Memphis school district and suburban Shelby County school district and 
how the state’s role can either assist or undermine regional efforts). 
308. One potential effective incentive could come by way of the federal government placing pressure on 
the state government to enact regionalist reforms.  In the words of education professors Jennifer 
Holme and Kara Finnigan: 
One possible source for incentives could be the federal government, which is current-
ly using an incentive-based approach to stimulating educational reform in states and 
districts through the Race to the Top and Investing in Innovation programs.  The 
federal government may also consider providing some exemptions to—or special 
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reward teachers and students for academic performance with moderate success.309  
States could adopt similar financial incentive programs via state legislation to en-
courage school districts to participate in regional plans that coordinate actions be-
tween school districts on key issues such as student enrollment. 
Further, the content of such state legislation mandating or incentivizing 
cooperation between neighboring school districts should, broadly speaking, in-
clude the following four types of provisions.  First, the legislation should define 
the geographic region in which cooperation between school districts will be re-
quired or encouraged.  The process of defining the region should not be static, 
but should instead take into account the geographic proximity of localities with-
in the region and the ways in which they are socially and economically interde-
pendent.310  One suggestion for defining the region is to adopt the definition of 
the metropolitan statistical area set forth by the U.S. Census Bureau.311  While 
such a definition would not work in all cases,312 it could work in many cases and 
is an easily definable parameter. 
Second, the legislation should include provisions that increase the permea-
bility of school district boundary lines so that students are not limited to attending 
schools in only their school district.  Increasing the permeability of school district 
boundary lines must be a critical component of any plan to enact regionalism in 
  
provisions in—federal accountability requirements as an incentive for greater cooper-
ation to improve cross-district diversity. 
 In addition, the federal government could also consider requiring states to enact 
regionalist reforms as part of the requirements to receive funds under Title I of the 
Elementary Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”).  Such an approach could be par-
ticularly effect because Title I funds are such a crucial component of school funding 
that to date no state has opted out of complying with ESEA and lost federal funding.   
Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 24; see Bowman, supra note 256, at 937 
(“[N]o state has yet opted out of NCLB/ESEA and refused [federal] funds.”).  
309. See generally Eric A. Hanushek, Outcomes, Costs, and Incentives in Schools, in IMPROVING 
AMERICA’S SCHOOLS: THE ROLE OF INCENTIVES 29, 42–43 (Eric A. Hanushek & Dale W. 
Jorgenson eds., 1996). 
310. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1834–35 (2002) 
(commenting that the definition of a region should accommodate as many of those affected by 
regional decisions as possible). 
311. See Metropolitan and Micropolitan, supra note 19, for a definition of metropolitan statistical area. 
312. In some cases the MSA used by the U.S. Census Bureau encompasses portions of several states.  
For example the Washington, D.C., MSA used by the U.S. Census Bureau encompasses 
Washington, D.C., and parts of Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia.  Washington-Arlington-
Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Metro Area, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
econ/census/snapshots_center/dc.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).  In such a case, the MSA 
would not provide a useful guideline for establishing a region for purposes of facilitating regional 
cooperation among school districts.  Instead, a more flexible definition that takes into account 
geographic proximity and practical interactions between the localities should be adopted. 
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public education.313  One of the most detrimental impacts of the strong prefer-
ence for localism in public education is the way in which it legally perpetuates ra-
cial and economic segregation in schools.314  One way to increase the 
permeability of school district boundary lines is to enact legislation that requires 
school districts within a defined region to engage in regionalist mobility strate-
gies, such as the voluntary interdistrict student assignment plans or strategically 
sited magnet schools, like the plans already in existence in Connecticut and Min-
nesota.315  States could also increase school district boundary permeability if legis-
lation required school districts within the region to enact open enrollment across 
all of the districts within the defined region, meaning that a student is entitled to 
enroll in any school district within the metropolitan region.316 
Third, in order to ensure that schools within a metropolitan region at least 
work toward achieving diversity, the legislation should require that there be re-
gional diversity goals that the school district members of the region collectively 
meet.  Of course, in keeping with the Supreme Court’s admonition in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 that school districts 
look to race-neutral alternatives to obtaining diversity,317 any such diversity 
goals should be broadly defined to focus on race-neutral factors that have prov-
en effective in increasing racial and economic diversity.  Such factors might in-
clude geography and class in the form of preferences for students seeking to 
transfer from a high poverty urban school district to a low poverty suburban 
school district and vice versa. 
Fourth, the legislation should require resource sharing between school dis-
tricts in the form of a tax base sharing plan in order to ameliorate the fiscal dispar-
  
313. See Wilson, supra note 138, at 651–54. 
314. See supra Part II.D. 
315. See, e.g., the discussion on the Nebraska Learning Community infra Part IV.B. 
316. Notably, programs such as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) public choice provision which 
give students attending failing schools the opportunity to transfer and enroll in a higher performing 
school within the same district have a relatively low usage rate.  See Susan L. DeJarnatt, School 
Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 16 n. 88 (2008) (noting 
the low percentage of students who opted to transfer to a better performing school utilizing the 
NCLB public choice provision).  But as I noted in a previous article, a significant reason why 
parents and students do not utilize the public choice provision is that the provision limits their 
options to intradistrict transfers which leaves parents and students with few options because failing 
schools are often clustered in one district.  See Wilson, supra note 138, at 660.  Enacting open 
enrollment across school district boundary lines would alleviate that problem.   
317. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1, 551 U.S. 701, 733–35 
(2007) (finding two voluntary school district desegregation plans unconstitutional where the school 
districts failed to demonstrate that they made a good faith effort to use race-neutral alternatives to 
obtain diversity). 
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ities in public education caused by tax base inequality.318  The specifics of any tax 
base sharing plan would be limited by the strictures of state laws pertaining to 
school finance.  Nevertheless, funds from the tax base sharing plan should then be 
redistributed on a needs basis so that poorer school districts within the region can 
improve their schools via an “in-place” strategy.319 
B. Federated Regionalism in Public Education 
Just as predominately white and affluent localities remain resistant to re-
gionalist solutions, many poor, predominately minority localities resist regionalist 
solutions as well.320  Minority resistance to regionalism is primarily rooted in fears 
that regional governance structures will result in cultural dilution and loss of po-
litical power.321  Many regional proposals advance mobility strategies aimed at 
deconcentrating minority populations to move them toward housing, job, or edu-
cation opportunities and to remove the geographic barriers to opportunity.322  
Mobility strategies are seen as culturally diluting because they require assimilation 
on the part of minorities without a reciprocal embrace of minority cultures and 
values by the predominately white communities into which they are dispersed.323 
Some also view regional mobility strategies as potentially diluting minority 
political power because they often disperse minorities throughout the metropoli-
tan region.324  Further, even when regionalism does not encompass a mobility 
  
318. See, e.g., the discussion on the Nebraska Learning Community infra Part IV.B. 
319. The term “in-place” strategy means methods of moving resources and opportunities to low-income 
predominately minority school districts in order to improve those school districts.  See john a. 
powell, Addressing Regional Dilemmas for Minority Communities, in REFLECTIONS ON 
REGIONALISM 218, 229 (Bruce Katz ed., 2000).   
320. See john a. powell, supra note 319, at 228–229 (detailing minority resistance to regionalism and 
noting that despite the potential economic benefits of regionalism, “given the history of urban 
renewal, and racism in general, there is a strong concern that regionalism, if successful, would deal 
with concentrated poverty by dispersing the inner-city minority community”). 
321. Id. at 229–30. 
322. See, e.g., Debray & Frankenberg, supra note 32, at 281 (proposing increasing federal housing 
voucher program to deconcentrate residential poverty and segregation in urban areas); Wilson, 
supra note 138, at 661–64 (proposing a regional mobility strategy through the No Child Left 
Behind Act’s public choice provision to allow urban minority students to cross jurisdictional 
boundary lines to enroll in high performing schools); Mark Shroder, Moving to Opportunity: An 
Experiment in Social and Geographic Mobility, 5 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES., no. 2, 2001, at 
57, 57–58 (describing a HUD program which enables low-income individuals who receive public 
assistance in housing to have portable vouchers which allow them to move to middle-class 
neighborhoods throughout metropolitan areas). 
323. See powell, supra note 319, at 230 (arguing that integration through regional mobility programs can 
fragment a minority community by requiring assimilation and dilution of minority culture and 
values). 
324. Id. 
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strategy and instead incorporates a regional governance structure of some sort, 
there is fear that the regional governance structure will not be responsive to the 
needs of minority communities.325  Thus, many minority communities reject re-
gionalism, particularly regionalist proposals that call for mobility and instead ad-
vocate for “in-place” strategies that focus on bringing more resources to minority 
communities without dispersing minority community members.326 
Scholars advance federated regionalism as an appropriate framework to ad-
dress these concerns.  The quintessential feature of the framework is that it inte-
grates regional cooperation while at the same time preserving local autonomy.327  
Under a federated regionalism scheme, “a regional authority controls access to the 
opportunities that have regional dimensions, but local authorities control other 
matters,” particularly those that call for political and cultural empowerment.328  
Put another way, federal regionalism adds a new level of regional government to 
metropolitan regions, acting to supplement rather than supplant local govern-
ments. 
Examples of federated regionalism include the regional governing bodies in 
Minneapolis329 and Portland,330 which allow for regional policymaking and plan-
  
325. Id. at 231. 
326. Id. at 230. 
327. Id. at 232–33 (“Federated regionalism requires entities within a metropolitan region to cooperate 
on some levels and leaves them relatively autonomous on others.”). 
328. john a. powell, RACISM AND METROPOLITAN DYNAMICS: THE CIVIL RIGHTS CHALLENGE 
OF THE 21ST CENTURY 4, 5 (2002), available at http://www.centerforurbanstudies.com/doc 
uments/electronic_library/neighborhoods/racismandmetrodynamics.pdf. 
329. The Minnesota state legislature enacted a regional governing body for the Twin Cities, known as 
the Metropolitan Council (Met Council).  See generally Land Use Planning—The Metropolitan 
Land Use Planning Act, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 305 (1977) (noting that the Minnesota 
legislature created the Met Council in response to increasing urbanization in the Twin Cities).  
The Met Council is empowered to review all comprehensive plans of localities within the seven 
county Twin Cities area and ensure that they conform to regional goals.  See MINN. STAT. § 
473.173(1) (2013) (“The council shall review all proposed matters of metropolitan significance to 
be undertaken by any private organization, independent commission, board or agency, local 
governmental unit, or any state agency . . . .”). 
330. The Oregon state legislature in conjunction with local referenda created the Portland  Metro 
(Metro).  See generally Carl Abbott & Margery Post Abbott, A History of Metro, METRO (May 
1991), http://library.oregonmetro.gov/files//abbott-a_history_of_metro_may_1991.pdf.  The 
Metro has responsibility for planning, policymaking, and public service provision on a regional 
level.  See Full Text of the Metro Charter, Preamble, METRO (Nov. 1992), http://www.oregonmetro. 
gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=629 (establishing the Metro) (last visited Feburary 4, 2014); see also 
David Rusk, Growth Management: The Core Regional Issue, in REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 
78, 99–100 (Bruce Katz ed., 2000) (describing the Metro regional government); About Metro, 
METRO, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.web/id=24201 (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) 
(describing the Metro as an elected regional government that “serves more than 1.5 million 
residents in Clackamas, Multnomah and Washington counties and the 25 cities in the Portland 
region”). 
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ning on important issues that transcend local borders—such as housing, trans-
portation, and land use planning—while at the same time keeping power vested 
in local governments to deal with local matters and implementation of regional 
goals.331  In addition, another example of federated regionalism in practice is the 
tax base sharing plan in Minneapolis, Minnesota that requires localities within 
the Twin Cities to contribute 40 percent of their commercial-industrial tax reve-
nues to a regional fund.332  The fund distributes the proceeds across the region ac-
cording to need.333 
In addition to seeking to balance local autonomy and regional interests, an 
effective system of federated regionalism should have voting schemes that allow 
for representatives to be elected to the regional layer of government through a 
cumulative voting model.334  Such a model would allow minorities to preserve the 
strength of their voting bloc without requiring them to remain geographically 
static.335  Thus, under a system of federated regionalism, minorities could chose 
to remain in their neighborhoods and still have access to regional power and re-
sources because of the regional level of government that would exist.  Conversely, 
they could also relocate to another locality within the region but with the aid of a 
cumulative voting system, without risking political dilution.336 
In the case of public education, states should enact federated regionalism by 
constructing a regional governing body that coordinates activities between all of 
the school districts within a metropolitan region.  Significantly, the people should 
  
331. Powell, supra note 320, at 241–42. 
332. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473F.07 (2013). 
333. See Myron Orfield & Nicholas Wallace, The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971: The Twin 
Cities’ Struggle and Blueprint for Regional Cooperation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 591, 592 
(“[Under the tax sharing plan], [m]unicipalities are assigned a portion of [the regional pool], based 
on population and the ratio of the total market value of property per capita in the jurisdiction to the 
average market value of property per capita in the region.  The formula assigns a share of the pool 
that is greater than a locality’s population proportion to municipalities with lower-than-average 
market value per capita; whereas high-market-value localities receive a lower portion than their 
population share.” (footnote omitted)). 
334. See powell, supra note 319, at 235 (“A federated or cumulative voting structure coupled with 
regional districting is one of several initiatives that could constitute a form of federated 
regionalism.”). 
335. Id. at 233–34.  For an overview of the ways in which cumulative voting schemes help to enhance 
minority voting strength, see generally Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious 
Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1632–33 (1993) (“Under a 
modified at-large system [of cumulative voting], each voter is given the same number of votes as 
open seats, and the voter may plump or cumulate her votes to reflect the intensity of her 
preferences.  Depending on the exclusion threshold, politically cohesive minority groups are 
assured representation if they vote strategically.” (footnotes omitted)). 
336. Notably, however, the effectiveness of cumulative voting in ensuring that minority political power 
is not diluted presumes cohesion of interests amongst minority groups.  See Guinier, supra note 
335, at 1633. 
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directly elect the regional body through means such as a cumulative voting system 
that would increase the likelihood of significant minority representation in the 
regional governing body.337 
The regional governing body could have policymaking authority regarding 
issues such as school diversity, the use of funds obtained from a tax sharing plan, 
and educational programming aimed at reducing achievement gaps within the 
metropolitan area.338  Importantly, a federated system of regionalism in public 
education would allow school districts to retain significant autonomy over critical 
issues such as the day-to-day operations of the school district (for example, the 
school district budget, interdistrict student assignment, school activities, and cur-
riculum).  At the same time, however, the existence of such a regional governing 
body could ensure that students who would otherwise be confined to school dis-
tricts with concentrated racial segregation and poverty have the opportunity to 
access a high-quality school. 
C. Equitable Federated Regionalism in Practice: What it Should Look Like 
As noted by education scholar Jennifer Jellison Holme, a modern example 
of a system of regional governance that incorporates federated regionalism ex-
ists in Omaha, Nebraska.339  A closer viewing of the program demonstrates that 
it also incorporates equitable regionalism.  Thus, the Omaha, Nebraska, plan is 
worth highlighting as an example of how federated regionalism might work in 
practice. 
Omaha, Nebraska, created the Metro Area Learning Community (Learn-
ing Community) “in an effort to resolve educational and boundary issues among 
several school districts in the Omaha metropolitan area.”340  It contains three cen-
tral elements that exhibit the promise of regionalism in public education and 
demonstrates what this Article’s proposed Equitable Federated Regionalism 
could look like. 
First, Nebraska state legislation created it.341  Because the state mandated 
the regional efforts, school districts in the Omaha metropolitan area are required 
  
337. See Holme & Finnigan, School Diversity, supra note 111, at 20 (suggesting that in order for 
interdistrict councils to be effective, representatives should be directly elected and representation 
should be proportionate to the population). 
338. See id.  
339. Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational Policy, supra note 24, at 153. 
340. See Press Release, Gov. Dave Heineman, Gov. Heineman Signs Learning Community Bill Into 
Law (May 24, 2007, 2:30 PM), available at http://www.governor.nebraska.gov/news/2007_05/ 
24_learning.html. 
341. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2102 (2008) (“A learning community shall be established for each city 
of the metropolitan class and shall include all school districts for which the principal office of the 
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to participate in the Learning Community thereby increasing the scope of the 
program.  Moreover, the legislation created a regional governance council called 
the Learning Community Coordinating Council (LCCC).342  The LCCC en-
compasses eleven school districts across two counties.343  Significantly, LCCC 
consists of a twenty-one member board of individuals who are directly elect-
ed.344  The people elect twelve members of the LCCC through a limited voting 
scheme.345  A caucus of school board members elects six members to represent 
the interests of local school boards.346  School boards of any districts that fail to 
win a seat through the election or caucus process appoint the final three mem-
bers.347  This proportional voting scheme, along with the allowance for direct 
representation, at least offers the promise that minority voices will be represent-
ed on the regional governance council, which addresses the potential concern 
for political and cultural dilution that regionalism often creates with minority 
communities. 
Second, the legislation created a mandatory tax base sharing plan for the 
eleven school districts within the Learning Community.348  The legislation as-
sessed a levy across the property tax of all eleven school districts.349  Then the state 
redistributed the funds from the levy to individual school districts based on their 
  
school district is located in the county where the city of the metropolitan class is located and all 
school districts for which the principal office of the school district is located in a county that has a 
contiguous border of at least five miles in the aggregate with such city of the metropolitan class.”).  
Notably, the legislature enacted the legislation after Omaha Public Schools (OPS) threatened to 
utilize a statute that allowed OPS to annex suburban school districts.  See Margaret Reist, OPS’ 
Vision: One City, One School, JOURNALSTAR (Sept. 23, 2007, 7:00 PM), http://journalstar.com/ 
special-section/news/ops-vision-one-city-one-school/article_fabab7bb-23e5-5911-8e1a-21f506 
5a997a.html.  As a compromise and in lieu of OPS’s utilization of the annexation provision, the 
Nebraska state legislature enacted legislation creating the Learning Community.  See Jellison 
Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational Policy, supra note 24, at 155–59 (describing how 
the Learning Community legislation resolved the dispute regarding OPS’s attempt to annex 
suburban school districts). 
342. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2102 (2008). 
343. See Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational Policy, supra note 24, at 153. 
344. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-546.01(1) (2012). 
345. See Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational Policy, supra note 24, at 153.   
346. Id. 
347. Id.   
348. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2104 (2012) (giving the coordinating council the authority to levy a 
common levy for the general funds of member school districts; levy for early childhood 
education programs for children in poverty; and, adopt, approve, and implement a diversity 
plan, which shall include open enrollment); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-3442(2)(b) (2012) (“For 
each fiscal year, learning communities may levy a maximum levy for the general fund budgets of 
member school districts of ninety-five cents per one hundred dollars of taxable valuation of 
property subject to the levy.”). 
349. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-2104(1)–(2); Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational 
Policy, supra note 24. 
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level of need according to a formula generated by the state.350  Notably, the tax 
sharing plan was subject to much political resistance and ultimately a legal chal-
lenge.  Nevertheless, the legal challenges to the tax base sharing plan were not 
sustained351 and despite political opposition, the tax sharing plan was recently 
reauthorized by the Nebraska state legislature in 2013.352 
Finally, and significantly, the legislation encourages the learning communi-
ty to create a desegregation plan to ensure socioeconomic and racial diversity 
across the eleven school district boundary lines.353  Students may attend schools 
within the Learning Community across school district boundary lines, with 
transportation provided in most instances.354  This ensures that school district 
boundary lines are permeable and makes available high-quality educational op-
portunities to students who the state would otherwise deny access.355 
CONCLUSION 
The combination of metropolitan fragmentation and localism creates race- 
and class-based disparities between neighboring localities within metropolitan 
areas.  Because states draw school district boundary lines so that students go to 
school where they live, localism and fragmentation create similar race- and class-
based segregation and inequality between neighboring school districts. 
In this Article, I have argued that in order to ameliorate the race- and class-
based disparities between neighboring school districts caused by metropolitan 
fragmentation and localism, some forms of regionalism should be applied to pub-
lic education governance structures.  Given the equity issues present in public ed-
ucation, the Article specifically suggests that equitable regionalism, or regionalism 
in which the state requires or heavily incentivizes cooperation between local school 
districts, is necessary.  The Article further suggests that any such legislation 
should include provisions that require or encourage school districts within met-
  
350. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1073 (2012) (“[P]roperty tax receipts shall be divided among member 
school districts proportionally based on the difference of the school district’s formula need . . . .”). 
351. See Sarpy Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Learning Cmty. of Douglas & Sarpy Cntys., 808 N.W.2d 598 
(Neb. 2012). 
352. See LB 585, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013), available at http://nebraskalegislature.gov/ 
FloorDocs/103/PDF/Intro/LB585.pdf. 
353. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-2104(7) (2012) (stating that the learning community coordinating 
council has the authority to “[a]dopt, approve, and implement a diversity plan which shall include 
open enrollment”); Id. § 79-2110 (outlining the requirements for diversity plans adopted by the 
Learning Community). 
354. See id. § 79-2110.01 (stating that Learning Community students who enroll in a district through 
the open enrollment process will be treated like residents of the school district in which they are 
enrolled). 
355. See Jellison Holme et al., Regional Coalitions and Educational Policy, supra note 24. 
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ropolitan regions to adopt enrollment plans that allow students within metropoli-
tan regions to cross school district boundary lines to attend school.  The Article 
also proposes that school districts within metropolitan regions be required or en-
couraged to share financial resources through the enactment of a regional tax base 
sharing plan. 
Finally, the Article recommends incorporating elements of federated re-
gionalism into public education governance structures.  Incorporating elements 
of federated regionalism would consist of putting in place a directly elected school 
district regional governing body through some form of proportional voting.  The 
school district regional governing body would not displace local school districts; 
rather, the governing body would supplement local school districts by having pol-
icymaking authority to address regional equity issues such as regional diversity in 
schools and the sharing of resources.  Enacting a combination of equitable and 
federated regionalism, or what this Article calls Equitable Federated Regional-
ism, would ensure that poor minority parents like Ms. Williams-Bolar would be 
able to obtain access to a high-quality education for their children without having 
to violate the law and become felons in order to do so. 
